The  NEPA-Abroad  Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order by Pincus, Glenn
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 3 Article 7 
7-1-1981 
The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive 
Order 
Glenn Pincus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Glenn Pincus, The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 611 
(1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol30/iss3/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE "NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY: UNRESOLVED BY AN
EXECUTIVE ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS. ABROAD AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 12114 ...................... 611
II. THE "NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY: HISTORY AND AR-
GUMENTS ........................................ 616
A. Congressional Extraterritorial Authority ...... 616
B. The Wording of the Act: Statutory Construction 619
C. The Legislative History of NEPA ............. 622
1. The 90th Congress and the Joint Colloquium 623
2. The 91st Congress: H.R. 12549, S. 1075, and
NEPA ......................... ... 625
3. Legislative Oversight Hearings ............ 627
D . Case Law ................................... 628
E. Administrative History and Policy Considera-
tions ....................................... 631
III. THE EECUTIVE ORDER: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ... 638
A. Provisions .................................. 638
1. Authority, Purpose, and Scope ............ 638
2. Agency Assessment Procedures ............ 640
3. Exemptions, Modifications, and Exclusions 641
4. Analysis ................................ 642
B. An Alternative: Applying NEPA Abroad ...... 651
C. Impact of the Executive Order: The First Three
Years ....................................... 653
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION ................ 658
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 12114
In May, 1980 a divided Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) authorized the export of critical components for the first
commercial nuclear power plant to be built in the Philippines.1
1. The Commission issued two orders: In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631
(1980); and In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 672 (1980). The first order concluded
that Westinghouse's export license application met the applicable licensing criteria pre-
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Notwithstanding that the reactor would be built and operated by a
country with virtually no experience with nuclear power, and
would be located in a known earthquake zone in the shadow of
four volcanoes, the Commission acted without preparing an envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) and "with virtually no technical
review of the potential health, safety, and environmental impacts
from the reactor that ultimately will be constructed." 2 Yet in
March, 1981 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision.3
The Commission argued that the EIS requirement of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)4 "does not apply
to impacts in a foreign country,"5 but rather is limited only to "re-
quire consideration of impacts on the United States and to permit
consideration of impacts on the global commons."" The NRC ra-
tionalized that principles of national sovereignty constrained it
from insisting on inspections of sites in another country.7 Chal-
lenging the Commission, the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) argued that the NEPA EIS requirement does apply to the
foreign effects of a domestic licensing decision.8 The court ob-
scribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1976) as amended by
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), 22 U.S.C. § 3201 et seq. (Supp. III
1979). 11 N.R.C. at 631. The second order declared that the NRC would only consider those
"health, safety and environmental impacts arising from exports of nuclear reactors... that
could affect the territory of the United States or the global commons." 11 N.R.C. at 672.
The first order produced four separate opinions, the plurality opinion of two commissioners,
a concurrence, and two separate dissents. "Global commons" signifies the high seas, Antarc-
tica, and portions of the high seas not subject to any nation's jurisdiction.
2. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n (NRC),
647 F.2d 1345, 1370 (1981) (Robinson, J., concurring in the judgment).
3. 647 F.2d 1345 (1981).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as NEPA or the Act]. NEPA has
been called the "seminal enactment" of United States environmental law. W.H. RODGE,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RODGERs]. The "heart" of NEPA, id.
at 725, is § 102(2)(C) which requires "all agencies of the Federal Government" to include "in
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement" on,
among other things, "the environmental impact of the proposed action," expected "adverse
environmental effects," possible alternatives and other short term and irreversible effects. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
5. 647 F.2d at 1355. See also 11 N.R.C. at 656. The Commission previously ruled that
NEPA does not require it to prepare an EIS to assess the "site specific" foreign environ-
mental impacts of a proposed reactor export. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977).
6. 647 F.2d at 1353 (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1355. The court characterized the "material NEPA issue on appeal" as
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served that "[c]onstruing the equivocal reach of NEPA abroad...
is a judicial endeavor oft-encountered, but not yet fully realized by
any court," and that therefore it would face the issue only "tenta-
tively."' In the end, it called for "a certain modesty on the part of
United States regulators regarding foreign impacts which are basi-
cally someone else's problem." 10 Nevertheless the court limited its
holding to the unique facts of the case and avoided the issue of
NEPA's overall foreign applicability: "I find only that NEPA does
not apply to NRC nuclear export licensing decisions-and not nec-
essarily that the EIS requirement is inapplicable to some other
kind of major federal action abroad." '11
In fact, the extent to which NEPA, and particularly its EIS
requirement, applies to United States agencies' actions which have
significant environmental effects outside the United States has
been one of the major controversies in American environmental
policy and law during the last decade, putting government agen-
cies, congressional committees, environmental organizations and
business groups at odds. During the first six years of NEPA's life,
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was created
by NEPA, 12 issued three progressively more rigorous sets of EIS
preparation guidelines.' s In November, 1978 CEQ adopted binding
regulations14 designed to improve the EIS process and make the
"whether the federal decision to export a reactor, causing no significant American or global
impacts, nevertheless triggers the requirement of a site specific environmental impact state-
ment, solely because of effects occurring in a foreign jurisdiction." Id. at 1366.
9. Id. at 1355.
10. Id. at 1365 n.105.
11. Id. at 1366.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (Title II).
13. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTI-
TUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 248 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). The CEQ
Guidelines were at 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1978), 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973). Some of CEQ's pow-
ers to implement NEPA derive from the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1976), and more importantly from Exec. Order No. 11514, issued by
President Nixon, 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974) (Mar. 5, 1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at
1722 (1976). The Order directed CEQ to issue EIS preparation guidelines. CEQ, in fact, has
emerged as NEPA's "undisputed overseer," RODGERS, supra note 4, at 705, despite the fact
that Sen. Henry Jackson, popularly known as the "father of NEPA," believed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) would play the agency coordinating role. National Envi-
ronmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752, Before the Sen. Comm. on Inte-
rior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 116-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Comm.
Hearings].
14. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1980). Issued pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 C.F.R.
124 (1978) (May 24, 1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 1600 (Supp. 11 1978),
19811 613
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EIS more useful to decision makers. The regulations completely
omitted, however, any discussion of whether NEPA applies to fed-
eral agencies' overseas activities. CEQ explained that this omission
was due to the expected issuance of an Executive Order setting out
the Carter Administration's position on this issue.15 Finally, on
January 4, 1979 President Carter signed an Executive Order"
which attempts to reconcile the demonstrated need for information
regarding overseas environmental impacts of federal actions with
the apprehensions of business, military, and diplomatic
organizations.
The Order for the first time sets rules for federal agencies to
assess the extraterritorial impact of their projects, exports, or other
actions. The Order declares that while it is based on "indepen-
dent authority," it "furthers the purpose of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act."18 The Order also expresses a substantive pur-
pose: "to enable . . Federal agencies . . . to be informed of
pertinent environmental considerations and to take such consider-
ations into account, along with other pertinent considerations of
national policy."' 9 The Order also expressly limits its purpose to
amending Exec. Order No. 11514, supra note 13. It is significant that these regulations are
binding on agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1; Exec. Order No. 11991 § 2. Previously some courts
had held that the CEQ Guidelines were "merely advisory," since CEQ lacked authority
under NEPA to prescribe regulations. Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424
(5th Cir. 1973) ("possible HUD non-compliance with CEQ Guidelines raise[d] no legal is-
sue," id. at 426, because HUD's own internal procedure setting thresholds for EIS prepara-
tion "was not unreasonable." Id. at 422). See also National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455
F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971) ("the Council's function is in no way regulatory.").
The 1978 regulations also cover more aspects of NEPA than the guidelines, which had
applied only to EIS preparation. The regulations apply to the whole NEPA process, from
the pre-EIS phase, through EIS implementation and any agency follow-up.
15. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1366 (Dec. 1, 1978). Explanation was from a CEQ
spokesperson.
16. Exec. Order No. 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, 3
C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 1604 (Supp. II 1978) [hereinafter
referred to as the Executive Order].
17. In the Philippine reactor case, the court found that NRC's reliance on a "concise
environmental review" submitted by the State Department pursuant to the Executive Order
did not violate NEPA. 647 F.2d at 1365. Exec. Order No. 11030 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959 -
1963 Compilation), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
18. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980).
19. Id. Perhaps no other single statement in the Order reveals so clearly the underlying
compromises between the two agencies which drafted the Order, CEQ and the State Depart-
ment; that is, CEQ's emphasis on "environmental" considerations and the State Depart-
ment's concern with "other" policy considerations. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 129-
131 & 196 infra. The two agencies' conflicting authority in this area dates back to Executive
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"solely" establishing agency procedures, stating that "nothing in
this Order shall be construed to create a cause of action."2 It is
likely that the Order's primary purpose must be inferred from its
declaration that it "represents the. . . government's exclusive and
complete determination of the procedural and other actions to be
taken by Federal agencies to further the purpose of [NEPA]. 21
That is, the main purpose, ostensibly to establish a uniform gov-
ernment policy, really is to end the "bureaucratic wrangling" and
"closed door horse trading within the executive branch"2 2 before
the issue is resolved by court decision 28 or Congress.24
The omission of extraterritorial environmental impacts from
the NEPA regulations and the attempt to encompass the appropri-
ate agency procedures in an executive order represent extraordi-
nary treatment for this single facet of NEPA enforcement, treat-
ment which can best be understood by a review of the history of
(and the controversy surrounding) foreign application of NEPA. In
the sections that follow this Comment will (1) review the ten-year
controversy, (2) analyze the provisions of the Executive Order, and
Order No. 11514 (1970), supra note 13, which set forth CEQ's responsibilities in furtherance
of NEPA's "purpose and policy-"
§ 3. The Council on Environmental Quality shall:
(a) Evaluate existing and proposed policies and activities of the Federal Gov-
ernment...
(b) Recommend to the President and to the agencies priorities among pro-
grams...
(c) Determine the need for new policies and programs for dealing with envi-
ronmental problems not being adequately addressed.
(g) Advise and assist the President and the agencies in achieving interna-
tional cooperation for dealing with environmental problems, under the foreign
policy guidance of the Secretary of State.
(h) Issue guidelines to Federal Agencies for the preparation of [EISs] ... as
required by section 102(2)(C) of [NEPA].
(i) Issue such other instructions to agencies, and request such report and
other information from them, as may be required to carry out the Council's re-
sponsibilities under [NEPA].
3 C.F.R. 271 (1974).
20. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-1, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
21. Id. § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980). Similar language appears in § 3-1: "This Order is
solely for the purpose of establishing internal procedures for Federal agencies to consider
the significant effects of their actions on the environment outside the United States ... "
22. 124 CONG. REc. S6513 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson). See
text & accompanying note 130 infra.
23. See text & accompanying notes 105 & 108 infra.
24. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 128-29 infra.
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(3) present conclusions regarding the Order's impact during its
first three years and its adequacy to provide appropriate environ-
mental assessment, accountability, and disclosure.
II. THE "NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY: HISTORY AND
ARGUMENTS
NEPA subsection 102(2)(C) requires from all federal govern-
ment agencies an EIS on "major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment."2 5 In 1976, Russel
W. Peterson, then departing CEQ Chairman, noted differing
agency interpretations and practices concerning the foreign appli-
cation issue. To encourage a consistent application of NEPA, he
advised that NEPA requires analysis and disclosure of federal ac-
tions' significant impacts on the human environment-"in the
United States, in other countries, and in areas outside the jurisdic-
tion of any country. 2 6 Unfortunately neither other government
agencies, the courts, nor scholarly commentators have found the
issue so free from ambiguity.
27
This section reviews the decade-long controversy and the posi-
tions taken by Congress, courts, and administrative agencies. Ini-
tially, to determine whether NEPA applies to federal actions that
have extraterritorial impacts a two-fold inquiry is required: first,
whether Congress has such authority, and second, whether that au-
thority was exercised.
A. Congressional Extraterritorial Authority
Neither federal nor international law2s prohibits Congress
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
26. Peterson, Memorandum to Heads of Agencies Regarding Environmental Impacts
Abroad (Sept. 24, 1976), reprinted in CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY-1977: THE EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT 393, also reprinted in 42 Fed. Reg. 61068 (1977).
In a companion memorandum Peterson noted that "the 'human environment' is not lim-
ited to the United States," and that in "a statute which in other sections [e.g., §§ 101(b)(2),
101(b)(4), 201] refers specifically to the national environment, the term human environment
in 102(2)(C) reflects an intent to cover impacts beyond U.S. borders." Memorandum on the
Application of the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal
Actions, reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY-1977, supra at 394.
27. See, e.g., Gaines, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions": An
Executive Order Ordains a National Policy, 3 HARv. ENV. L. REV. 136, 137-38 (1979).
28. Since federal courts would enforce a federal statute, international law would not
"prohibit" national enforcement of extraterritorial legislation.
[Vol. 30
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from giving extraterritorial effect to its enactments. Although this
authority sometimes depends on the extraterritorial conduct hav-
ing domestic effects, 9 or threatening state security or government
functions,30 a state has jurisdiction to prescribe laws attaching le-
gal consequences to the conduct of citizens wherever such conduct
occurs.31 In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,3 2 the Supreme Court reit-
erated its rule that "the United States is not debarred by any rule
of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens
upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of
other nations or their nationals are not infringed." 3
Nevertheless, this authority is limited by a common law pre-
sumption against application of a United States statute in a for-
eign jurisdiction unless there is a clearly expressed intent that the
statute should apply." The error in applying this presumption to
the NEPA-abroad controversy 5 is that extraterritorial application
of the Act is largely an irrelevant issue. Rather, NEPA's procedural
requirements are solely directed to agencies of the federal govern-
ment-no individual conduct of (civilian) citizens is either pre-
scribed or proscribed. Nor are activities or rights of any foreign
29. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as the RESTATEMENT].
30. Id. § 33(1).
31. Id. § 30(1)(a). See also, RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 63 (1934): "A nation
... has jurisdiction over its nationals wherever they may be to require or forbid them to do
an act unless the exercise of this jurisdiction involves the violation of the law or public
policy of the state where the national is."
32. 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (U.S. trademark infringement statute applies to U.S. citizen in
foreign country).
33. Id. at 285-86 (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
34, See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) in which the Court refused
to extend a statute (the Eight Hour Law) limiting the working hours of persons employed
under federal contracts to American workers so employed in Iran and Iraq. See also the
RESTATEENT, supra note 29: "The rules of United States statutory law.., apply only to
conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United States, unless
the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." § 38.
35. Virtually all commentary opposing the foreign applicability of NEPA has stressed
section 38 of the REsTATEENT, supra notes 29 & 34. See, e.g., Note, The Scope of the
National Environmental Policy Act: Should the 102(2)(C) Impact Statement Provision be
Applicable to a Federal Agency's Activities Having Environmental Consequences Within
Another Sovereign's Jurisdiction?, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 317 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Syracuse Note]; Office of General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Memorandum, The
Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to Major Federal Actions With Envi-
ronmental Impacts Outside the United States, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. S19,358, S19,375
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Defense Dep't Memorandum]; Brower, Is
NEPA Exportable?, 43 ALB. L. REv. 513, 517 (1979).
6171981]
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nations or citizens affected.38 Further, the ultimate decisionmakers
responsible for federal agency decisions are based in the United
States, not foreign jurisdictions.7 As one commentator observed,
such "decision-making within the halls of the United States Gov-
ernment does not apply NEPA extraterritorially." 3s
The separation of powers doctrine also might limit Congress'
authority to enforce NEPA provisions overseas, if the Act's re-
quirements infringe on the President's constitutionally derived for-
eign policy power. Yet, NEPA's EIS requirements are procedural,
a requirement ensuring that agency decisionmakers be informed
regarding the environmental effects of their actions. No particular
substantive decisions potentially infringing on presidential author-
ity need be reached.39
Since there is no question that Congress has authority to en-
force NEPA procedural requirements on all federal agencies, the
remaining issue is whether Congress so intended. This is essen-
tially the same issue which faced the Supreme Court in Foley Bros.
v. Filardo.4 0 The rationale of Foley, however, that such "lain in-
tention. . . should not be attributed to Congress in the absence of
a clearly expressed purpose, "41 is not applicable to NEPA for the
36. It is true that the EIS process may impose burdens on other countries as conditions
on American participation in a project. Nevertheless, the foreign sovereign is free to cooper-
ate with the procedures or not as it chooses.
37. The Defense Department Memorandum, supra note 35, tries to refute this point by
drawing an analogy between Foley Bros., 336 U.S. 281, and NEPA enforcement, arguing
that "[t]he court would look to the basic concern of the statute (environmental impacts in
NEPA and the performance of work in Foley Brothers) to determine when the statute was
being applied extraterritorially." 124 CoNG. REC. at S19,375 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The
memorandum's error is that the concern of NEPA § 102(2)(C) is not environmental impacts,
but procedural requirements binding on no one but United States government agencies.
Even the NRDC v. NRC court conceded that nuclear plant export licensing "takes place, of
course, at NRC headquarters inside the United States." 647 F.2d at 1355.
38. Gaines, supra note 27, at 141.
39. See generally Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact
Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 353 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mich. Note].
NEPA's § 101 policies, concededly, are substantive. Since, however, these policies are re-
quired to be "consistent with other essential considerations of national policy," § 101(b), 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b), it is hard to visualize where, or how, an infringement on the executive
branch's foreign policy authority could occur.
40. 336 U.S. 281. The Court wrote, "[t]he question before us is not the power of Con-
gress to extend the Eight Hour Law to work performed in foreign countries .... [S]uch
power exists .... The question is rather whether Congress intended to make the law appli-
cable to such work." Id. at 284-85.
41. Id. at 286.
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very reason emphasized by the Foley Court-enforcement of
NEPA, unlike the labor law in contention in Foley, does not inter-
fere with foreign sovereigns' laws and customs.42 Where a construc-
tion of extraterritorial application does not infringe upon foreign
sovereigns or foreign nationals, or otherwise violate international
law, the Supreme Court standard does not demand a "clearly ex-
pressed purpose" from Congress. Rather, the Court has considered
other evidence of intent, as well as the construction's policy impli-
cations, to infer congressional intent.43
In most circumstances, the determination of congressional in-
tent is a matter of statutory construction, requiring examination of
an act's language and legislative history. In this instance, however,
the Act's grandiose language is ambiguous, and the legislative his-
tory, though voluminous with regard to the overall Act, is virtually
nonexistent on the issue of assessing extraterritorial environmental
effects. Therefore four additional aids of statutory construction
must be used: legislative oversight hearings; cases; administrative
actions; and policy reasons favoring a particular construction. In
light of this standard of review, this Comment will now examine
NEPA, its legislative history, and other evidence, and conclude
that the Act applies outside the United States borders. The Execu-
tive Order will then be assessed in that context.
B. The Wording of the Act: Statutory Construction
The section 102(2)(C) EIS mandate requiring "all agencies" to
include impact statements in "every" report regarding major ac-
tions that significantly affect the "human environment" 44 raises
two issues crucial to the NEPA-abroad debate. The first question
is whether "all agencies of the Federal Government" means just
that, or means all agency offices located on American soil, whose
activities have no foreign environmental impacts. One early com-
mentator asserted that "[t]he phrase is unqualified and its clear
and natural meaning is that every federal agency, regardless of the
42. The Court wrote "[t]he absence of any distinction between citizen and alien labor
indicates to us that the statute was intended to apply only to those places where the labor
conditions of both citizen and alien employees are a probable concern of Congress." Id.
43. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). See also People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 356 F. Supp.
645 (D. Hawaii 1973).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
6191981]
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locus of its activities, was intended to be included."4 5 Nothing on
the face of the Act suggests any reason not to give the words "all"
and "every" their plain meanings. Further, when subsections
102(2)(C) and (F)46 are considered in tandem, it is difficult to see
any merit in the contention that the EIS requirements of section
102 should be limited to domestic impacts. 7 Of course the crucial
issue is the locus of the environmental effects-the agency activity
may be nothing more than approving a loan from a Washington,
D.C., office.
The second issue concerns NEPA's requirement to prepare
EISs when agency actions affect the "human environment.' 48 One
45. Mich. Note, supra note 39, at 358. Actually § 102 qualifies its requirements with the
proviso, "to the fullest extent possible." The pertinent language is: "The Congress autho-
rizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible; . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed [environmental impact] statement.
(F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems ......
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), (F) (1976).
46. See note 45 supra, for the context. Section 102(2)(F) states in full: [all agencies of
the Federal Government shall-]
(F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems
and where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States lend appropri-
ate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize inter-
national cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1976).
47. Brower expounds the novel thesis that the two paragraphs must be read with the
interpretation that since paragraph (F) does not repeat paragraph (C)'s EIS requirements,
and since paragraph (C) does not include paragraph (F)'s explicit procedural requirements,
the "more logical interpretation" is that the two paragraphs do not supplement each other,
but stake out separate geographical territories. Brower sees the choice as between "multilat-
eral political cooperation" and "unilateral jurisdictional ravis' ment." Brower, supra note
35, at 514, 519.
The Defense Department Memorandum, supra note 35, reaches the same conclusion for
an opposite reason. Noting that paragraph (F) requires recognition of the "long-range char-
acter of environmental problems" and that paragraph (C) encourages "long-term productiv-
ity," the memorandum concludes the paragraphs' requirements "overlap . . . suggesting
that paragraph (F) was intended to displace rather than supplement paragraph (C)." 124
CONG. REC. at S19,362 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
48. Section 101(a) of the Act uses similarly broad language in its policy statement:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activities on ...
the natural environment . . . declares that it is the continuing policy of the
"NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY
congressional opponent of overseas NEPA application argued that
the statute's "general provisions" do not connote that Congress
was distinguishing between the human environment and the Amer-
ican environment,49 but rather that Congress was requiring that
the environment be considered from a "human perspective rather
than solely from an objective physical perspective." 50 This reason-
ing is sound, but still places no geographic limits on NEPA's scope.
Another argument against extraterritorial application calls for
balancing "specific" words used in the Act such as "Americans"
and "Nation" against "ambiguous" words such as "biosphere."'51
Presumably the "specific" words reveal a Congressional intent not
to require foreign impact assessment. In fact, no inconsistency of
language exists that is so serious as to deny the basic structure of
the Act in its entirety; some sections apply uniquely to the geo-
graphic United States,52 while the scope of other sections, notably
section 102,5s is not geographically limited."
It has also been argued that section 102(2)(F), requiring recog-
nition of the "worldwide . . . character of environmental
problems, ' 55 must be interpreted as standing alone5" among sec-
Federal Government... to use all practicable means. . . to create and main-
tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4321(a) (emphasis added).
49. 124 CoNG. REC. S19,357 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Sen. McClure). Sena-
tor McClure continued, "I do not believe that such general references in the language of
NEPA can fairly be read as requiring that Federal agencies must take unilateral action in
considering the environmental effects of exports which only affect a foreign country." Id.
McClure even questioned the President's authority to impose requirements on all Federal
agencies through the (then) proposed Executive Order. Id. at S19,358.
50. Mich. Note, supra note 39, at 360.
51. Syracuse Note, supra note 35, at 326. This Note seems further to grasp at straws by
asserting that NEPA "heralds, by its title . . .domestic interest ... a concern with the
environmental policy relating to one nation, the United States." Even disregarding §
102(2)(F), see note 46 supra, the notion that a country's "national" policy does not include
concern for the effects of its actions on other countries is preposterous.
52. See, e.g., §§ 101(b), (c) & 201, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), (c) & 4341 (setting forth sub-
stantive goals and policies).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(I).
54. A sound discussion of this point is found in Note, Exports and Environmental Re-
sponsibility: Applying NEPA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 249
(1979).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F). See note 46 supra.
56. See note 47 supra.
1981] 621
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion 102(2)'s nine paragraphs.5 7 Examination of the paragraphs
other than paragraph (F), in the entire context of section 102,
strongly suggests that all" the paragraphs are supplementary. In-
deed, the paragraphs all overlap somewhat with the EIS require-
ments of paragraph (C),59 but it would be absurd to conclude, for
instance, that the directive in paragraph (A) to "utilize a system-
atic, interdisciplinary approach" 60 precludes agencies from using
such an approach in an impact statement. Nor do any of these
"other-than-EIS" requirements conflict with the paragraph (F) di-
rective to "recognize the worldwide and long-range" nature of envi-
ronmental problems. 1 The best interpretation is that the elements
of section 102 supplement each other in an elegant manner; among
the ways worldwide, long-range problems are to be recognized are
for agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach, 62 consider pres-
ently unquantified environmental amenities,63 develop resource use
alternatives," and-in the case of major actions having significant
effects on the quality of the human environment-prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement.
It seems clear that the correct construction of the Act's lan-
guage applies the EIS requirements to all agencies, regardless of
where the environmental effects of their actions occur. Neverthe-
less, it must be conceded that section 102(2)(C) does not expressly
stipulate the geographic scope of the EIS requirement. Therefore,
this Comment will further support this construction by examining
NEPA's legislative history.
C. The Legislative History of the Act
The EIS requirement was developed late in the NEPA enact-
ment process, and its legislative history is sparse; discussion of its
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(I).
'58. Section 102(2)(D) is gramatically inconsistent with the other paragraphs and di-
rectly supplements § 102(2)(C). It results from a 1975 amendment to NEPA (Pub. L. No.
94-83) to remedy administrative difficulties regarding the degree to which EIS responsibili-
ties may be delegated by federal agencies to state agencies. S. REP'. No. 152, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 859.
59. § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
60. § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
61. § 102(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F).
62. § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
63. § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B).
64. § 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
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scope in terms of geography, nearly nonexistent. For this reason,
the impact statement requirement must be considered within the
context of the Act's entire history.e5
1. The 90th Congress and the Joint-Colloquium. During the
1960s Congress grappled with various approaches to a national en-
vironmental policy 66 only to have jurisdictional disputes hamper
progress.6 7 Finally in 1968 the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs convened a Joint Colloquium 8 to explore considerations
relevant to environmental management and policy.
Prior to convening the Colloquium each of the two committees
issued reports. The more detailed of the two was a special report
prepared for the Senate Committee.69 In a section entitled "Na-
tional Policy and International Cooperation," the report affirmed
the Committee's understanding that:
The United States, as the greatest user of natural resources and manipulator
of nature in all history, has a large and obvious stake in the protection and
wise management of man-environment relationships everywhere.... Effec-
tive international environmental control would ... be in the interest of the
United States, and could hardly be prejudicial to the legitimate interests of
any nation.70
The report by the House Committee's Subcommittee on Science,
65. For other thorough discussions of aspects of the legislative history, drawing conclu-
sions opposite from each other, compare Mich. Note, supra note 39, at 365-71, with Defense
Dep't Memorandum, supra note 35, at S19,362-72.
66. At the close of the 90th Congress, the Legislative Reference Service counted more
than 100 bills which were directly concerned with environmental issues. In the 91st Con-
gress at least 40 bills concerned with either a national environmental policy or the study of
the overall problems of the environment were introduced. Many of NEPA's concepts and
ideas were incorporated from NEPA predecessor bills, particularly S. 2549, the Resources
and Conservation Act, introduced by Sen. Murray in 1959, and S. 2282, introduced by Sen.
Nelson in 1965. See 115 CONG. REC., n.5, 29,068, & 19,011.
67. Defense Dep't Memorandum, supra note 35, at S19,363.
68. Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the Environment,
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House Comm.
on Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 17, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Col-
loquium]. Participants included the Committees and representatives from academic institu-
tions, environmental organizations and federal agencies including Stewart L. Udall, Secre-
tary of the Interior; Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; John
A. Baker, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture; and Wilbur J. Cohen, Secretary of Health Edu-
cation and Welfare.
69. SPECIAL REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 90TH
CONG., 2D SEss., A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968).
70. Id. at 13.
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Research and Development similarly noted that "[e]nvironmental
management will often transcend national borders."7' It recom-
mended that a national policy should consider "worldwide effects"
and encourage international cooperation. 2
At the Colloquium itself most witnesses spoke in terms of the
American domestic environment, but the need to consider the con-
sequences of our international actions was also emphasized. 3 The
Colloquium resulted in a Congressional White Paper, issued by the
two Committees, summarizing the proceedings. The final section
of the White Paper suggested the following language for a stat-
ment of policy: "It is the policy of the United States that: Environ-
mental quality and productivity shall be considered in a worldwide
context, extending in time from the present to the long-term
future. '7
5
The Joint Colloquium led directly to NEPA, and it is clear
from the record of the proceedings and the published White Paper
that the participants viewed a national environmental policy both
as an urgent necessity 8 and in a worldwide context,7 but not as
71. SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCI-
ENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (Comm.
Print 1968).
72. Id. at 7.
73. S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, summarized the feeling
of the Colloquium, that "to speak about environmental quality without at least referring to
the fact of the international components and consequences of even our activity as Ameri-
cans ... appears to me to be somewhat shortsighted." Colloquium, supra note 68, at 74.
Ripley recommended that the environmental consequences of extra-territorial activities
such as the proposed sea-level Panama Canal be fully assessed before acted upon. Id. at 74-
75.
Russel Train, President of the Conservation Foundation emphasized "the international
aspects of any national environmental policy" and recommended assessment of the environ-
mental impacts of national programs such as foreign economic assistance and other interna-
tional developments. Id. at 81.
74. HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS AND SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as CONG. WHITE PAPER]. The
White Paper was inserted into the Congressional Record during debate by Sen. Jackson, 115
CONG. REc. 29,078.
75. CONG. WHITE PAPER, supra note 74, at 15. The policy statement continued,
"[a]lthough the influence of the U.S. policy will be limited outside of its own borders, the
global character of ecological relationships must be the guide for domestic activities. Ecolog-
ical considerations should be infused into all international relations." Id.
76. Words and phrases such as "must," "it will be necessary," and "requirement" are
used throughout the policy statement. Id. at 15-16. See, e.g., note 75 supra.
77. CONG. WHITE PAPER, supra note 74, at 15.
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sufficient unto itself.78 The participants began to recognize that in
addition to substantive goals, procedural requirements within the
government were needed to gather information and coordinate
agency action. 9 These, of course, are the two functions of the envi-
ronmental impact assessment process; thus the environmental im-
pact statement requirement was born in the 91st Congress.
2. The 91st Congress: S. 1075, H.R. 12549, and the Act.
NEPA's final wording was drafted by a House-Senate conference
committee combining independent Senate and House bills.80 Dr.
Lynton K. Caldwell, in his written statement to the hearing on the
Senate bill,81 emphasized, "[t]he term 'environment' includes the
life-support system of our nation and of all the earth....
[A]lthough our immediate concern is with environmental policy in
America, that policy must permit our nation to play a constructive
role in international efforts to safeguard the biosphere of the whole
earth ..... "I Since it was also Dr. Caldwell's specific recommen-
dation for an action-forcing provision that developed into the EIS
requirement, s it is evident that the father of the impact statement
saw his provision in a worldwide context.
The State Department also recognized an American interest in
78. The White Paper states, "[i]t should be recognized that the declaration of a na-
tional environmental policy will not alone better or enhance the total man-environment re-
lationship. The present problem is not simply the lack of a policy. It also involves the need
to rationalize and coordinate existing policies." Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 12. That these needs were recognized as requiring a procedural solution
within the government is clear from the text which immediately continues: "Environmental
problems cut across so many existing operational organizations that coordination in both
the executive and legislative branches must be improved." Id.
80. H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-12, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2768 [hereinafter cited as CoNF. REPORT].
81. Sen. Comm. Hearing, supra note 13. Since NEPA § 102, including the EIS require-
ments and the mandate to recognize worldwide problems, came from the Senate bill, the
Senate legislative history (hearings and report) would ordinarily be the most appropriate
source for insights into Congress' purpose. In NEPA's case, however, the version of the bill
on which the hearings were held did not contain the EIS and other action-forcing require-
ments which became § 102; they were added to the Senate bill following the hearings. Fur-
ther, the Senate Report ignores the specific issue of the geographic scope of the assessment
process. SEN. COMM. ON INTEMOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st. Cong., 1st Sees. (1969).
82. Sen. Comm. Hearing, supra note 13, at 128 (statement of L. Caldwell).
83. Caldwell testified: "When we speak of policy we ought to think of a statement
which is so written that it is capable of implementation; ... [that it is] not merely a state-
ment of desirable goals or objectives; but that it is a statement which will compel or rein-
force or assist all of these things, the executive agencies in particular. . . ." Id. at 116.
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a worldwide environmental context, "dictated by the realization
that the human environment is one, and that it would be fallacious
and arbitrary to divorce the international aspects from the na-
tional. '8 4 Finally, Senator Jackson, who had introduced the Senate
bill, stated that NEPA "is a Congressional declaration that we do
not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions
which endanger the continued existence or the health of
mankind." 5
Although the House bill did not contain the section 102(2) ac-
tion-forcing procedural requirements, it contained the policy state-
ment which essentially became NEPA section 101(a), and the pro-
visions to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. Therefore
the House bill's legislative history also is relevant to the territorial
scope of NEPA. At the House bill hearings 6 significant testimony
cited examples of federal activities which have environmental con-
sequences outside the United States. 7 These points were reiter-
ated in the House Report s8 which stated that "[tlhe international
aspects are clearly a major part of the questions which the Council
84. Id. at 9 (statement of W. Macomber, Ass't Sec'y of State for Congressional Rela-
tions). The Defense Department Memorandum, supra note 35, in an exhaustive study of the
legislative history, quotes parts of Caldwell's testimony, supra notes 82-83 & accompanying
text, and the State Department's testimony, to insist again that the only worldwide context
Congress envisioned was participation in bi- and multilateral projects: "These recommenda-
tions are not for unilateral action by the United States in its activities that have interna-
tional environmental impacts, but for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other na-
tions. . .." Defense Dep't Memorandum, supra note 35, at 19,367. Again, it must be
pointed out that NEPA § 102 only prescribes certain agency procedural requirements;
neither "unilateral action," nor any particular substantive decision is required.
85. 115 CONG. REC. 19,009. These remarks were made when Jackson submitted to the
Senate floor the Sen. Comm. Report, supra note 81, which included the NEPA § 102 action-
forcing procedures.
86. Environmental Quality: Hearings on H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R.
12180, H.R. 12207, H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264, H.R. 12409, & H.R. 12143, Before
the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
87. E.g., nuclear testing, insecticide and fertilizer exports (statement of Margaret
Mead), id. at 26; Defense Dep't dumping of poisonous gas in the ocean, AID engineering
projects (statement of S. Dillon Ripley and remarks of Rep. Goodling), id. at 108-10; poison-
ous gas disposal (statement of Elizabeth M. Wallace), id. at 115; Aswan Dam and other
dams (statement of Lloyd Tupling), id. at 117-18. Other witnesses made similar references.
Dr. Mead, especially, noted, "we have a kind of double responsibility not to export
trouble. .. ." Id. at 27 .
88. HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIEs, H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
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[on Environmental Quality] would have to confront."89
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that the action-forc-
ing requirements of section 102(2)(C) evolved along with congres-
sional concern for worldwide environmental problems and the
United States contribution to those problems. Although Congress
evidently failed to deliberate upon the specific issue of the geo-
graphical scope of the EIS requirement, nothing in the debates,
hearings, or reports provides any reason not to give the words of
the Act their plain meaning. The issue finally came before Con-
gress during oversight hearings on NEPA in 1970.
3. Legislative Oversight: Administration of NEPA. In Decem-
ber, 1970, oversight hearings on agency compliance with section
102(2)(C) and section 103 of NEPA were held. by a subcommittee
of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.9 0 At
these hearings the State Department presented a memorandum of
law contending that federal activities occurring within another
country's jurisdiction should not be subject to NEPA require-
ments.9 1 This interpretation was bluntly rejected by the subcom-
mittee which stated that "[s]uch a position is contrary both to the
language and to the intent of NEPA. '92 The subcommittee con-
cluded, "[t]he history of the Act makes it quite clear that the
global effects of environmental decisions are inevitably a part of
the decision-making process and must be considered in that
89. Id. at 7. The House Report stated that the hearing testimony "stressed the impor-
tance" of environmental problems' international aspects. Id.
90. Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act, Part 2: Appendixes to
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 548 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearings].
91. Memorandum prepared by Office of the Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, Application
of [NEPA] to Actions of the Federal Government Occurring Outside the United States
(May 4, 1970) [hereinafter cited as State Dep't Memorandum], Oversight Hearings, supra
note 90, at 591.
In a separate memorandum, the State Department representative claimed that the EIS
procedures "will be applicable to very few actions of State and AID because the actions
affecting the environment in which our agencies participate, directly or indirectly, almost
always occur within the territorial jurisdiction of some other state." Oversight Hearings,
supra note 90, at 546 (Memorandum of C.A. Herter, Jr., Special Ass't to the Sec'y of State
for Environmental Affairs, to C. Warren, Chairman CEQ) (May 4, 1970).
92. HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, ADMINISTRATION OF THE NA-






Although oversight hearings are not a direct part of a statute's
legislative history, this confrontation represents Congress' (or one
of its Committees') first consideration94 of NEPA's extraterritorial
scope. Therefore, the Committee's conclusions that NEPA does ap-
ply overseas must be given considerable weight.
D. Case Law
Several cases prior to the Philippines reactor case considered
NEPA's extraterritorial applicability. Although none of those
courts made a definitive holding on the issue, no court exempted
foreign environmental impacts from NEPA's jurisdiction. Rather,
in every case the court either assumed the Act's applicability, or
approved a settlement between the parties that included an assess-
ment of the extraterritorial impacts.95
In the earliest case, Wilderness Society v. Morton,96 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit granted standing to Canadian intervenors
in the Alaska oil pipeline cases. The court recognized that the
Canadians who wanted the pipeline built through Alaska had dif-
ferent interests from the Americans who recommended a Canadian
route. The court found that the Canadians' interest, solely in the
environmental impacts within Canada, were within the zone of in-
terest protected by NEPA.
97
In People of Enewetak v. Laird,98 the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality requested a more complete environmental impact state-
ment from the Defense Department concerning simulated nuclear
explosive tests on Enewetak Atoll, whose people are foreign nation-
als. The Defense Department agreed to file the impact statement.
Most importantly, the court held it had subject matter jurisdiction
under NEPA to enjoin the project while the report was being pre-
pared: "NEPA is framed in expansive language that clearly evi-
93. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
94. Mich. Note, supra note 39, at 371.
95. Yost, American Governmental Responsibility for the Environmental Effects of Ac-
tions Abroad, 43 ALB. L. Rav. 528, 532 (1979).
96. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
97. Id. at 1262-63. Plaintiffs in this case alleged the Secretary of the Interior did not
comply with NEPA §§ 102(2)(C) (requiring impact statements) and 102(2)(D), now
102(2)(E) (requiring consideration of alternatives).
98. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973).
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dences a concern for all persons subject to federal action which has
a major impact on their environment-not merely United States'
[sic] citizens located in the fifty states."99
In Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Commission,100 the Commis-
sion (AEC, now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC), the
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), and the State Department were
sued to force preparation of an impact statement covering a nu-
clear power plant and nuclear fuel export program partly financed
by Eximbank. AEC settled by preparing a generic EIS on its over-
all nuclear export program.10 1 The court clearly assumed that fed-
eral actions were covered by NEPA and that some .(although not
necessarily each involved) federal agency would have to file an im-
pact statement for a foreign assistance program with significant
environmental effects.
In Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v. Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID),102 EDF alleged that AID had not
prepared an EIS regarding its role in helping foreign governments
procure and use pesticides (including those banned in the United
States). The case was settled by a stipulation that required AID to
prepare an EIS on its overseas pest management program, and to
issue regulations subjecting all aspects of its activities to NEPA. 10 3
The settlement specifically included impacts within individual for-
eign countries.
99. Id. at 816. The court also stated that "Wilderness Society seems to hold that
NEPA provides foreign nationals with certain rights when their environment is endangered
by federal actions." Id. at 818.
An interesting distinction was made by the same court in People of Saipan v. Depart-
ment of Interior. Although it held that NEPA applies to federal agency activities in the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the court concluded that under international law and
the Trusteeship Agreement with the United States, the Trust Territory Government is "not
a Federal Agency" and therefore its decision "not a 'federal' action within the meaning of
NEPA." 356 F. Supp. 645, 649, 653, 658 (D. Hawaii 1973), affd as modified, 502 F.2d 90
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
100. No. 1867-73, 6 E.R.C. 1980, 4 E.L.R. 20685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) (not officially
reported).
101. Since AEC was the lead agency, no ruling was made specifically either on NEPA or
Eximbank activities. Id. The resulting document was relied upon by NRC in the Philippines
reactor case. 647 F.2d at 1353 n.30, 1383 n.128 (concurring opinion).
102. No. 75-0500, 6 E.L.R. 20121, 20121-22 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 1975) (not officially
reported).
103. Id. The regulations required that AID not provide assistance for procurement and
use of several specific pesticides, any unregistered pesticide, any unregistered use for a pes-
ticide, or any suspended or cancelled pesticide, with certain limited exceptions such as
health problems or emergencies. 41 Fed. Reg. 1297.
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Two recent cases, however, show that the particular issue of
section 102(2)(C)'s foreign reach was not judicially resolved prior
to the Philippines reactor decision. In Sierra Club v. Coleman,
0 4
the district court held that the Department of Transportation's
(DOT) impact assessment for the Darien Gap portion of the Pan
American Highway in Panama and Colombia was deficient both
for impacts that affected the United States and impacts confined
to Panama. On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
finding that the EISs were adequate. The court noted that it
merely assumed, without explicitly deciding, that NEPA
applied.
10 5
In National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) v. Department of State,"6 the district court held that
participation of the United States in a Mexican herbicide (para-
quat) spraying program "is a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning
of Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.110 7 Yet this court too, relying on
the Sierra Club decision, found it necessary only to "assume, with-
out deciding, that NEPA is fully applicable to the Mexican herbi-
cide spraying program." 0
Finally, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Ex-
port-Import Bank,109 resulted in the first use of the Executive Or-
der. There NRDC sued to force Eximbank to establish EIS proce-
dures for its foreign projects such as loans for environmentally
significant equipment and services. NRDC dropped the suit in
February, 1979 after Eximbank agreed to adopt procedures to con-
104. 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated and remanded sub noam. Sierra Club v.
Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
105. 578 F.2d at 391-92 n.14 (1978). The court, noting that the government never ques-
tioned NEPA's applicability to the project, commented, "we need only assume, without de-
ciding, that NEPA is fully applicable to construction in Panama. We leave consideration of
this important issue to another day." Id.
106. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal dismissed, No. 78-1669 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24,
1979).
107. 452 F. Supp. at 1232.
108. Id. at 1233. The court noted that "[d]efendants entreat[ed] the Court to assume
without deciding, the applicability of NEPA to the Mexican impact of this country's partici-
pation in chemical eradication efforts in Mexico." Id. at 1232. At the same time defendants
agreed to prepare an "environmental analysis" of the program's effects in Mexico. Id. Al-
though observing that the government's request seemed to "beg the question," the court
cited Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, and left the question open.
109. No. 77-0080, 9 E.L.R. 20145 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1979).
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sider the environmental impacts of its foreign development loans
and to implement the Executive Order, 110 which first surfaced in a
hearing on this case in January, 1979.111
Nevertheless, the NRDC v. NRC court held that "NEPA has
not been de jure extended 'overseas.' ",112 The court distinguished
most of the cases cited in this section for "missing the foreign pol-
icy element"113 and chided the petitioners for presuming to "re-
present" the environment of the Philippines "from non-adjacent
America."'1 4 The court emphasized, and never questioned, the con-
sistent pattern in these cases of government defendants who
"never questioned" NEPA's foreign applicability" 5 and courts
which "have been able to avoid" the issue. 116
E. Administrative History and Policy Considerations
In December, 1977, CEQ circulated among agencies draft EIS
regulations as part of its effort to streamline the assessment pro-
cess, 1 but omitted any reference to the international application
of the EIS requirement. According to CEQ Chairman Charles War-
ren, this was because of the issue's "complexity and controversial
nature."
18
A preliminary draft of the omitted international regulations
portion, released in January, 1978, indicated that CEQ had consid-
ered requiring a full EIS only for major federal actions that signifi-
cantly affect the environment of the United States Trust Territo-
ries, Antarctica, and the global commons. A less demanding
"abbreviated" Foreign Environmental Statement (FES) was con-
sidered for major federal actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment of one or more countries. The FES would have included in-
formation on the project's purpose, the project's alternatives, and
110. Id. The stipulation also reserved NRDC's right to bring suit again if it concluded
Eximbank's procedures were not satisfactory. Id.
111. 9 EtNR. REP. (BNA) 2362 (Apr. 20, 1979).
112. 647 F.2d at 1367.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1368 (quoting Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d at 1391-92).
116. 647 F.2d at 1368 n.128.
117. CEQ Draft Regulations on NEPA, Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 8 ENvR. REP.
(BNA) 1291 (Dec. 16, 1977). CEQ did not release publicly the draft regulations at that time.
8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1236 (Dec. 16, 1977).
118. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1372 (Jan. 13, 1978).
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their consequences, and could have included such factors as diplo-
matic considerations and commercial competition. Agencies would
have had other normal EIS requirements waived.11
The preliminary draft regulations provoked widespread criti-
cism, both within and without the federal government. 120 Several
departments and agencies said the regulations could adversely af-
fect foreign trade, international relations and national security.121
Business and industry representatives made similar allegations.
1 22
On the other hand, environmentalists were also unhappy with
the less demanding Foreign Environmental Statement being con-
sidered by CEQ. They observed that a CEQ memorandum itself
pointed out that because NEPA is merely a procedural directive,
"[e]ven if federal activity abroad is unlawful in the United States,
NEPA does not prevent its being undertaken abroad."123
119. C. Warren, Council on Environmental Quality Memorandum to Agency Heads on
Overseas Application of NEPA Regulations, Jan. 19, 1978, 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1493-95
(Jan. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Memorandum]; CEQ Draft Regulations on Apply-
ing NEPA to Significant Foreign Environmental Effects, reprinted in 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
at 1495, also printed in 123 CONG. REc. at S6513-14 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as CEQ Preliminary Draft Regulations].
120. Shortly thereafter CEQ Chairman Warren declared that the proposed regulations
had brought "plenty of reaction" but "very little discussion." C. Warren, A Look Before We
Leap: Applying NEPA to U.S. Actions Abroad (1978) (remarks to 3rd Annual Conference,
National Ass'n of Environmental Professionals, Arlington, Va.), reprinted in 124 CONG. REC,
S6515 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Warren Remarks]. One newspaper,
Warren noted, denounced CEQ for its "hunger for power," id. (quoting The Arizona Repub-
lic), and two well known syndicated columnists charged the regulations were designed to
make "Uncle Sam the environmental policeman of the world." Id. (quoting Evans &
Novak).
The CEQ General Counsel, Nicholas Yost, called these preliminary draft regulations a
"discussion trigger." 8 ENmv. REP. (BNA) 1372 (Jan. 13, 1978).
121. 8 EmNR. REP. (BNA) 1463 (Jan. 27, 1978). The departments and agencies included
the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Treasury, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, and Eximbank.
122. See, e.g., note 133 infra (statement by Jack Carlson).
123. Warren, CEQ Memorandum, supra note 119, at 1495. One environmental com-
mentator observed:
there is serious question as to the legality of imposing less than the full panoply
of procedural obligations applicable to federal actions having domestic im-
pacts .... CEQ's creation of a hybrid FES with possible limiations [sic] on con-
tent and public participation seems to undercut the integrity of the NEPA
process.
Comment, Forthcoming CEQ Regulations to Determine Whether NEPA Applies to Envi-
ronmental Impacts Limited to Foreign Countries, 8 ENVT'L L. REP. 10111, 10112-13 (1978).
The Comment also observed that "CEQ's draft appears ... to block the public scrutiny
that has been an important part of NEPA .... [T]he hybrid FES... may in fact do more
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CEQ Chairman Warren, in that memorandum to federal
agency heads, cited court decisions and the language of NEPA to
support the CEQ position.124 Shortly thereafter Warren acknowl-
edged that the questions of whether agencies have the right to tell
other countries what environmental standards to impose, whether
the regulations would cost sales and jobs, and whether the regula-
tions are justified in law, are "important" and "practical."12 Yet
the CEQ Chairman emphasized again that NEPA "imposes no en-
vironmental standards on anybody, not even U.S. agencies," but
only creates a process. 126 He also observed that more and more
agencies had been applying NEPA to overseas activities. 27
In April, 1978 Senator Stevenson proposed an amendment to a
bill to extend the life of the Export-Import Bank that would pre-
vent the application of NEPA to Eximbank actions which have no
environmental impact upon the United States until Congress en-
acted legislation specifying the degree to which NEPA should ap-
ply to Eximbank actions. 2 s Stevenson emphasized that his propo-
sal did "not take sides" on the controversy, but merely returned it
"to Congress where it belong[ed].1'' 29 He felt that the question was
"tied up in bureaucratic wrangling within the administration," that
the "proper body" to decide the question was the Congress, and
that it was "indisputable" that Congress had "never faced the is-
sue squarely."' 30
damage to NEPA's integrity than simply finding that the statute does not apply to federal
actions with wholly foreign environmental impacts." Id. at 10113.
124. Warren, CEQ Memorandum, supra note 119. Warren specifically cited the lan-
guage of NEPA §§ 101, 102(2)(C), & 102(2)(F).
125. Warren Remarks, supra note 120.
126. Id.
127. Id. In addition to AID's EIS on its pesticide program, the State Department has
filed an EIS on the Panama Canal Treaties, the Interior Department and Federal Power
Commission on the Trans-Alaska natural gas pipeline through Canada, and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on its hurricane seeding program. See
note 257 infra.
128. 124 CONG. REC. S6513 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson)
(Amendment No. 1821 to S.2520). The text of the amendment was: "Except as otherwise
provided by law enacted after the date of enactment of this subsection, no rule, regulation,
or interpretation pursuant to [NEPA] . . .applies to an activity of the [Export-Import]
Bank which does not have an environmental effect within the United States." Id.
129. 124 CONG. REC. S6513 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson).
130. Id. Stevenson thus avoided some of the legalistic and ambiguous questions of syn-
tax and legislative intent that the controversy had raised. He concluded, "[t]he issue is not
whether NEPA applies in a narrow legal sense to Eximbank, but whether fundamental
choices between conflicting policy objectives should be made by closed door horse trading
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Following Stevenson's recommendation, in April, 1978, the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, in re-
sponse to NEPA litigation and CEQ's "premature issuance" of its
draft regulations,131 included the NEPA exemption in its favorable
report on the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1978. At hear-
ings on the proposed legislation before the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee's Resource Protection Subcommit-
tee,132 business and environmental groups presented opposing
views on the issue.13 3 The subcommittee agreed to schedule the
second hearing in order to give the primary agencies involved in
the dispute (CEQ and the State Department) more time to resolve
their differences.
At the second hearing in July, 1978 there still was not agree-
ment on the Administration's position, but the two agencies prom-
ised full accord by the end of that month.3 Agreement between
the two agencies, however, seemed unlikely. At the hearings, the
within the executive branch." Id.
131. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
AMENDMENTS OF 1978, S. REP. No. 844, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978). The report stated the
amendment was necessary so that the choices would be debated, and "not left to be settled
through inter-agency bargaining by executive branch bureaucracies." Id.
132. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has jurisdiction over
NEPA. It requested and was granted referral of S. 3077 from the Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, EXPORT-
IMPORT BANK AMENDMENTS OF 1978, S. REP. No. 1039, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
133. Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Resource Protection of the Sen. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Eximbank Hearings]. Compare, e.g., statement by Russel
Train (Pres. World Wildlife Fund, former CEQ Chairman) ("I have not addressed the nar-
row question of whether NEPA applies to Federal activities beyond the borders of the
United States for the simple reason that I consider it well settled by now that NEPA does
so apply."), id. at 4 with statement by Jack Carlson (Vice President U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce) (It was Congress' responsibility to rule, id. at 61, because the agencies themselves
disagreed, id. at 62, and the delays and costs of EIS requirements would have an adverse
impact on Eximbank performance, depress the export rate, increase the trade deficit, in-
crease unemployment, and limit American firms' ability to compete. Id. at 64.). Although
the hearings were specifically on the Eximbank legislation, the hearings also examined "the
broader policy issue of NEPA's application to the overseas activities of all Federal agen-
cies." Id. at 1 (remarks of Sen. Hodges).
134. The State Department Legal Advisor claimed "substantial progress" in the en-
deavor and that agreement was "emerging" on certain basic concepts for submission to the
President. Id. at 200 (statement of H. Hansel).
Senator Culver was scathing in his prophetic criticism of the Administration's delay: "I
am a little concerned this administration isn't aware enough that it may have only a short
life ahead. We wait and wait for this administration to get its act together .... You have a
4-year term as I read the Constitution." Id. at 201 (remarks of Sen. Culver).
"NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY
State Department legal advisor asserted that NEPA's legislative
history "shows that Congress never discussed whether the environ-
mental impact statement requirements of section 102(2)(C) are ap-
plicable to the effects of 'major federal actions' on the environment
outside the United States.
135
Subcommittee member Senator Muskie challenged the State
Department statement on Congressional intent, declaring frustra-
tion with "bureaucratic descriptions of legislative intent 1800 op-
posite from what I know actual legislative intent to have been....
I would not agree no reference [to overseas NEPA applicability]
was made."'13
At these hearings the State Department representative re-
vealed that the emerging agreement between the State Department
and CEQ would allow each agency to draw up its own procedures
to consider overseas environmental impacts, and might include the
program in an executive order.' The idea of regulations had been
dropped.
A draft executive order was circulated among federal agencies
at the end of July, 1978. While it reflected CEQ-State Department
accord on some issues-such as requiring a full EIS on projects
affecting the global commons-it also demonstrated significant dif-
ferences between the two agencies in other areas. In general the
State Department would have excluded more types of federal ac-
tions from thorough environmental assessment than CEQ, espe-
cially in the area of the export of hazardous (including radiologi-
cal) materials. The two agencies also failed to resolve disputes over
exemption criteria for nuclear related projects. 8
Senator Muskie, in a letter to President Carter, asserted that
135. Id. at 199 (statement of H. Hansell). Hansell also asserted that although some
agencies have developed foreign NEPA-use procedures, "in the past nine years there has not
been an attempt to establish a comprehensive, Government-wide program." Id.
136. Id. at 219-20 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). Muskie added, "[t]he thought never oc-
curred to me that somewhere down the line 9 years later the argument would be made that
because major Federal actions impacting on areas outside the United States were not specif-
ically referenced that, therefore, they were excluded." Id. at 220.
137. Id. at 200 (statement of H. Hansell).
138. Draft Exec. Order on Reviewing Environmental Effects of Major Federal Actions
Abroad, reprinted in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 568 (Aug. 4, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Exec. Order]. The Draft Executive Order presented the conflicting recommendations of the
State Department and CEQ in an unusual side-by-side format. Reference will occasionally
be made, therefore, (where the two agencies were not in accord) to the CEQ version or to
the State Department version of the Draft Executive Order.
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the draft executive order fell short of NEPA requirements and "ac-
complishes far too little."139 Regarding the alternative proposals of
CEQ and the Department of State, Muskie wrote, "[iln every case,
I urge you to support the alternative advanced by the Council on
Environmental Quality. I view the State Department alternatives
to be less than the law requires." 140
Following the Eximbank hearings, the Senate Subcommittee
unanimously voted to strike the Eximbank exemption and the sub-
committee's parent Committee on Environment and Public Works
recommended that the provision be deleted."" The Committee Re-
port included a letter to President Carter urging formulation of an
Administration policy on the NEPA-abroad question before fur-
ther Senate debate was held on the Eximbank bill.
14 2
At a September, 1978 press briefing on national export policy,
139. E. Muskie, letter to Pres. Carter (Aug. 3, 1978), quoted in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
665 (Aug. 18, 1978).
140. Id. at 666. Muskie identified four "specific concerns:" (1) "the burden of proof
should be on the agency to demonstrate why anything less than a full environmental impact
statement is needed;" (2) there should not be "wholesale categorical exemptions;" (3)
"wholesale exemptions for export licenses and actions taken under the Nuclear Nonprolifer-
ation Act are inappropriate;" and (4) "such an [executive] order would not be the exclusive
and complete fulfillment of [NEPAl."
141. S. REP. No. 1039, supra note 132, at 11-12.
142. Id. at 3-4 (letter from Sen. J. Randolph, Chairman, to Pres. Carter). The letter
also stated that the Committee was "anxious to see that consideration is given to the envi-
ronmental consequences in other countries of Federal decisions, but also that appropriate
procedures are outlined to accommodate legitimate foreign policy, national defense and ex-
port concerns." Id. at 4.
The Senate also demonstrated its continuing concern regarding the controversy in sum-
mer 1978 by adopting Senate Resolution 49, a Foreign Relations Committee proposal urging
the United States to negotiate a treaty "requiring the preparation of an international envi-
ronmental impact statement for any major project, action, or continuing activity which may
reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the physical environment or
environmental interests of another nation or a global commons area." S. Res. 49: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Sen. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). The resolution was introduced by Sen-
ator Pall who acknowledged that it was "an attempt to internationalize the environmental
impact process of NEPA." Id. at 28. Pell also questioned CEQ Chairman Warren on the
extent to which agencies were applying NEPA's EIS requirements abroad. Id. at 39-43. At
the hearing the State Department, despite its opposition to enforcing NEPA extra-territori-
ally, supported the resolution and the concept of an international environmental impact
statement, with reservations regarding perceived restraints on sovereignty. Id. at 12 (state-
ment of Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmen-
tal and Scientific Affairs). Hearings continued into July, 1978. See Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Arms Control, Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign
Relations on S. Res. 49, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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President Carter promised he would "shortly" issue the executive
order which would exempt "from any environmental reviews" ex-
port licenses issued by the Departments of Treasury or Commerce,
and permits, approvals, and similar documents.4 CEQ had
wanted such documents not exempted if they involved hazardous
chemicals or radioactive substances. Thus it was clear that the
State Department, which had wanted generally fewer restrictions,
was prevailing within the Carter Administration. Moreover, only
abbreviated environmental reviews would be required for (1) nu-
clear reactors, (2) financing of products and facilities with toxic
public health risks, (3) certain actions adversely affecting the envi-
ronment of non-participating third countries or natural resources
of global importance.
14 4
By the time CEQ adopted its regulations in November, 1978
(which completely left out any discussion of whether NEPA ap-
plies abroad),1" there was considerable agreement between the two
sides on a number of points in the controversy. Among these were,
(1) NEPA's language is not explicit regarding the correct form of
foreign impact statements; (2) despite the comments of Senators
Jackson and Muskie, 48 the legislative history on the issue is sparse
and not specific; and (3) the court decisions had not given clear
direction. There also seemed to be general but not complete agree-
ment that United States actions in the global commons, and ac-
tions in a foreign country which in turn affect either the United
States or an uninvolved third country fall under NEPA require-
ments. Nevertheless, resolution of the most controversial question
remained: Does the EIS requirement apply to events taking place
exclusively within foreign sovereign territory?
14 7
This Comment will now examine the Executive Order of Janu-
ary 4, 1979, how it attempts to reconcile the diverse opinions re-
143. 9 ENvR. REP. (BNA) 1049 (Sept. 29, 1978).
144. Id.
145. 40 C.F.R. § 1500, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978. Theregulations significantly revise the previ-
ous guidelines (as well as the regulations' June, 1978 draft). Among major changes are: (1)
EISs should be limited to 150 pages and use plain language, (2) agencies should use a "scop-
ing" procedure to focus early on the key issues, (3) "cooperating" agencies may decline a
"lead" agency's invitation to participate, (4) agencies must prepare a public record of EIS
decisions, and (5) EISs must discuss energy requirements and the potential for conservation
in alternatives and mitigation measures.
146. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 85 & 136 supra.
147. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 35, at 513-14.
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viewed above, its likely effect on United States policy, and its suc-
cess in meeting the goals of NEPA.
III. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER: DISCUSSION
A. Provisions
The Executive Order comprises a citation of authority and
three sections which reflect the compromises reached by its au-
thors, representatives of CEQ and the State Department. Section 1
briefly outlines and narrowly limits the scope of the Order.'48 The
heart of section 2 identifies four categories of agency actions
abroad and introduces two new assessment documents less strin-
gent than the NEPA-required EIS, to be used where government
actions affect other nations' environments."4 " Section 3 contains
miscellaneous definitions and provisions,150 some of which also
weaken the Order.
1. Authority, purpose, and scope. In the citation clause,' 5'
President Carter supports the Executive Order "[b]y virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Laws of the
United States."'' 2 This vague citation of authority is echoed in the
"Purpose and Scope" section which asserts that "while based on
independent authority, this order furthers the purpose of
[NEPA]."' 5 The Order does not make clear whether the indepen-
dent authority is the President's general constitutional executive
148. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980).
149. Id. §§ 2-3, 2-4, 3 C.F.R. 357-58. The Order requires an EIS only when the agency
action affects the United States or the global commons. Id. §§ 2-3(b), 2-4(a)(i), 2-4(b)(i).
Section 2 then presents classes of exemptions, id. § 2-5(a), procedural modifications, id. § 2-
5(b), and discretionary categorical exclusions, id. § 2-5(c), all of which further blunt the
Order's impact.
150. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. 359-60.
151. Every executive order is required to cite its authority. Exec. Order No. 11030 §
1(b), 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
152. Exec. Order No. 12114 (Preamble), 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980).
153. Id. § 1-1. In a White House Fact Sheet, issued by the Office of the White House
Press Secretary, President Carter claimed "[t]he Order is based on my independent Consti-
tutional authority," but still failed to particularly designate that Constitutional source.
White House Fact Sheet, Exec. Order on Environmental Effects Abroad (Jan. 5, 1979), re-
printed in 44 Fed. Reg. 18723 (1979).
The Executive Order's citation of authority additionally claims to further the purpose of
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (1976), and the Deepwater Ports Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976)
which regulate certain actions in the global commons. Exec. Order No. 12114, §§ 1-1, 2-3(a),
3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980).
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power,154 his specific authority over executive agencies,15 or his re-
sponsibility for foreign policy and national security.56
This ambiguity regarding the Order's source of authority is in-
tentional. The Draft Executive Order cited the "purpose and pol-
icy" of NEPA in both the draft's citation of authority and in its
"Purpose and Scope" section.5 The final Order's amended lan-
guage deletes all reference to NEPA in the citation clause. In its
"Purpose and Scope" section, it deletes reference to NEPA's "pol-
icy" and merely cites NEPA's "purpose." 15 8 The Draft Executive
Order also did not contain the final Order's reference to the Presi-
dent's "independent authority.
1 59
The Order encompasses "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the environment" outside United States territory.6 °0 This
language seems to parallel both NEPA's purpose and policy.16 ' By
both definition and exemption, however, the Order severely limits
its own scope. First, the Order applies only to actions "not ex-
empted.' 16 2 Further, it declares that "'environment' means the
natural and physical environment and excludes social, economic
and other environments."'6e3 The Order then states that "an action
significantly affects the environment if it does significant harm to
154. See generally U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 1.
155. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
156. The Order's preamble states that the Order is "to further environmental objectives
consistent with the foreign policy and national security policy of the United States." 3
C.F.R. 356 (1980). Regarding the source of the President's authority in these areas, see gen-
erally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2. There must, however, be a statutory or Constitu-
tional source of authority for a Presidential executive order. See text & accompanying notes
200-07 infra.
157. Draft Exec. Order, Preamble & § 1-1, supra note 138.
158. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1. This was, therefore, an intentional deletion. Cf. Exec.
Order No. 11514, supra note 13, issued by President Nixon, which set out CEQ's responsi-
bilities to enforce NEPA ("By virtue of the power vested in me as President... and in
furtherance of the purpose and policy of [NEPA]") Preamble, 3 C.F.R. 271 (1974) (empha-
sis added), and Exec. Order No. 11991, supra note 14, issued by President Carter, amending
Exec. Order No. 11514, authorizing CEQ to issue binding regulations ("in furtherance of the
purpose and policy of [NEPAl").
159. Draft Exec. Order, supra note 138.
160. Exec. Order No. 12114, § 2-3(a)-(c), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980). Subsection 2-3(d) refers
to "major Federal actions outside the United States." 3 C.F.R. 357 (emphasis added). This
discrepancy, focusing on the locus of the activity (rather than the effect) does not seem
significant.
161. See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
162. Exec. Order No. 12114, § 2-1, 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
163. Id. § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360.
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the environment even though on balance the agency believes the
action to be beneficial to the environment.'1 6 4 A "multiple im-
pacts" limitation asserts that where a Federal action affecting the
American environment or global commons requires an EIS, if the
action also affects a foreign nation's environment, an agency need
not prepare an EIS with regard to those foreign effects. 16 Further,
the Order limits its purpose to that of "solely" establishing agency
procedures, stating that "nothing in this Order shall be construed
to create a cause of action."'"6 Finally, in addition to precluding
judicial review of agency compliance, the Order also attempts to
avoid court scrutiny of any provisions which conflict with past
NEPA decisions, directing that "[n]othing in this Order shall serve
to invalidate any existing regulations of any agency which have
been adopted pursuant to court order or pursuant to judicial set-
tlement of any case. .. 167
2. Agency assessment procedures. Section 2 requires agencies
to establish procedures to implement the Order.6 8 The Order's en-
vironmental assessment requirements establish categories of proce-'
dures based on the political jurisdiction over the impacted environ-
ment or the importance of the affected resources.6 9 Government
actions which significantly affect the environment of a nation not
involved in the action 70 (an "innocent bystander nation") require
the agency to prepare not an EIS, but either of two less rigorous
assessment documents created by the Order-a concise review of
the environmental issues involved' 7 ' or a bilateral or multilateral
environmental study,17 2 as determined by the agency. 17 3 In situa-
tions where United States actions significantly affect a participat-
ing or involved nation's environment, no assessment at all is re-
164. Id., 3 C.F.R. 360 (emphasis added). The Order is not clear whether this definition
is inclusive or exclusive. An exclusive construction would require that significant effects re-
quire significant harm, an interpretation attempted by the Defense Department. See text &
accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
165. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980).
166. Id. § 3-1, 3 C.F.R. 359.
167. Id. § 2-4(c), 3 C.F.R. 358.
168. Id. § 2-1, 3 C.F.R. 357. The Order set a Sept. 4, 1979 deadline. Nearly all agencies
failed to meet this deadline. See note 294 infra.
169. Exec. Order No. 12114 §§ 2-3, 2-4(a), (b), 3 C.F.R. 357-58 (1980).
170. Id. § 2-3(b), 3 C.F.R. 357.
171. Id. § 2-4(a)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 358.
172. Id. § 2-4(a)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 358.
173. Id. § 2-4(b)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 358 (emphasis added).
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quired unless the federal action is supplying either, (a) a product
or physical project which is prohibited or strictly regulated in the
United States because of its toxicity and danger to public health,
or (b) a physical project which is prohibited or strictly regulated in
the United States because of radioactive risks. In either of these
two situations the agency must prepare only either a concise envi-
ronmental review or participate in preparing a bilateral or multi-
lateral study.
174
Federal "actions outside the United States" which signifi-
cantly affect "resources of global importance" also require an envi-
ronmental assessment from the responsible agency. In this situa-
tion any one of the three types of documents-impact statement,
bilateral or multilateral study, or concise review-may be pre-
pared, at the agency's discretion.
1 7 5
3. Exemptions, modifications, and exclusions. In addition to
the clear limitations on the Order's scope by its definition of envi-
ronment 76 and its multiple impacts exemption,17 7 additional provi-
sions exempt actions that would otherwise be encompassed by the
Order. One, the final provision of section 2-4(b), states that an
agency need not prepare a new document when an impact state-
ment, bi- or multilateral study, or concise review already exists.1 78
Most exemptions to the assessment procedures are set forth in
seven categories of actions in section 2-5(a) and most of these, such
as the exemptions for actions affecting foreign policy, national se-
curity, and disaster reliefl7  do not conflict with CEQ's past en-
forcement of NEPA.5 0 The exemptions for permits or approvals
174. Id. §§ 2-3(c), 2-4(a)(ii), (iii), 2-4(b)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 357-58.
175. Id. §§ 2-3(d), 2-4(a)(i), (ii), (iii), 2-4(b)(iv), 3 C.F.R. 357-58.
176. Id. § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360. See text at notes 163-64 supra.
177. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980). See text at note 165 supra.
178. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(b), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980).
179. Id. § 2-5(a)(i) to (vii), 3 C.F.R. 358-59.
180. NEPA limits its own enforcement policy to the use of "practical means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy." § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Fur-
ther, § 105 states in its entirety that "[t]he policies and goals set forth in this chapter are
supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies." 42 U.S.C. §
4335. Even § 102, which includes the EIS mandate, only calls for existing policies, regula-
tions and laws to be interpreted in accordance with NEPA's "policies" "to the fullest extent
possible." § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1). Therefore, the Executive Order's exemptions for
actions not having significant environmental effects, § 2-5(a)(i); Presidential actions, § 2-
5(a)(ii); actions affecting national security, § 2-5(a)(iii); intelligence activities, § 2-5(a)(iv);
votes in international conferences and organizations, § 2-5(a)(vi); and emergency relief ac-
tions, § 2-5(a)(vii), do not conflict with NEPA's purposes or policies.
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and most actions relating to nuclear activities"8 ' are concessions to
commercial interests. Although the nuclear activities exemptions
do not encompass actions providing nuclear production, utilization,
or waste management facilities,8 " nuclear fuel shipments are ex-
empt from all review.
1 83
In addition to these express exemptions, section 2-5(b) grants
agencies discretion to modify further their assessment procedures
based on considerations of need for prompt action, 8" foreign rela-
tions,185 diplomatic'8 and national security '87 factors, and govern-
mental confidentiality. 188 This section further permits modifica-
tions, however, for reasons of "commercial confidentiality,"18' and
"international commercial, competitive and export promotion fac-
tors."1 '' The modifications section concludes with a "catch-all"
provision, permitting agencies to modify their assessment docu-
ments to "ensure appropriate reflection of . . .agency ability to
analyze meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed ac-
tion."' 1 The Order also permits agencies to make "categorical ex-
clusions" and additional exemptions for emergency circumstances
and unusual foreign policy and national security situations. ' Fi-
nally, the Order declares that its exemptions, modifications and ex-
clusions apply to actions affecting the global commons only "if per-
mitted by law,"1 93 but curiously fails to include a provision
demanding legality for application of its exemptions, modifications
and exclusions to other significant foreign impacts.
4. Analysis. This Comment began with the observation that
181. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-5(a)(v), 3 C.F.R. 358-59 (1980). The exemption for ex-
port approvals, however, does not exempt direct loans to finance exports. Id. § 3-4, 3 C.F.R.
360.
182. Id. § 2-5(a)(v), 3 C.F.R. 358-59.
183. Thus, although the Philippine reactor export approved in NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d
1345, is not itself exempt from all review, fuel exports for the reactor are.
184. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-5(b)(i), 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
185. Id. § 2-5(b)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 359.
186. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(1), 3 C.F.R. 359.
187. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(3), 3 C.F.R. 359.
188. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(4), 3 C.F.R. 359.
189. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(3), 3 C.F.R. 359.
190. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(2), 3 C.F.R. 359.
191. Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(5), 3 C.F.R. 359.
192. Id. § 2-5(c), 3 C.F.R. 359. This provision offers no explanation or guidance as to
what such special "circumstances" are not already covered by the exemptions and modifica-
tions of §§ 2-5(a) & (b).
193. Id. § 2-5(d), 3 C.F.R. 359.
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the extent to which NEPA applies to United States agencies' for-
eign impacts has been a continuing controversy in environmental
law and policy. The Executive Order does very little to'settle this
issue. By deleting reference to NEPA from the citation of author-
ity,194 and reference to the "policy" of the National Environmental
Policy Act from the "Purpose and Scope" section,198 the Order
"dodges the question" of NEPA's applicability."9 " Rather, it claims
that "[w]hile based on independent authority, [it] ... furthers the
purpose of [NEPA]."' Further, by declaring that the Order is the
government's "exclusive and complete determination" of proce-
dures to be followed by Federal agencies,198 apparently muzzling
CEQ on the issue, President Carter created a situation where the
courts might find that an agency action, in accord with the Order,
still is in violation of NEPA.
Every executive order must include a "citation of the author-
ity under which it is issued," 9 and must be authorized by the
Constitution or an Act of Congress.200 Otherwise an executive order
simply is regarded as an expression of the President's personal pol-
icies.201 This rule stems from the fundamental doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. 2  The Supreme Court has long held that in the
194. See text at notes 152 & 157-58 supra.
195. See text & accompanying notes 153 & 157-58 supra.
196. 9 IN'L ENVn. REP. (BNA) (Jan 10, 1979).
197. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980) (emphasis added).
198. Id.
199. Exec. Order No. 11030 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 610 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in
44 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
200. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
201. See, e.g., Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 236 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). The case concerned a challenge by cattlemen to
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulations which were alleged to conflict with an execu-
tive order. The court stated that "Presidential. . .orders have the force and effect of laws
when issued pursuant to a statutory mandate or delegation of authority from Congress." Id.
at 234. In this instance, the court wrote, the order "cites no specific source of authority
other than the 'Constitution and laws of the United States."' Id. (i.e., the same authority
cited in President Carter's Exec. Order No. 12114).
A district court had held that the order had statutory authority in § 202 of the Agricul-
tural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. § 1621. The Circuit Court overruled this holding be-
cause "[t]he broad language of § 202 simply states the policy objectives of the Act." Id. at
235. This is similar to the claim by Exec. Order No. 12114 that it "furthers the purpose of
[NEPA]." Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980).
The court additionally held that the article II, § 3 constitutional mandate to the Presi-
dent to faithfully execute the laws "does not [alone] give the executive order the force and
effect of law." 526 F.2d at 235.
202. The separation of powers doctrine divides governmental authority among the three
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absence of a delegation of authority or mandate from Congress, the
President may not act as a lawmaker.
0 3
In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the leading
case on the presidential power of executive orders, Justice Jack-
son's concurrence 20 presented three classifications of presidential
powers, according to their "disjunction or conjunction" with Con-
gress' authority.205 Jackson's approach would analyze the validity
of an executive order by determining into which of the three cate-
gories the action fits. Using this assessment system, President
Carter's Executive Order appears to fall into that category where
the measure is incompatible with Congress' "express or implied
will," and the President's power, therefore, "at its lowest ebb."200
Jackson concluded that such a Presidential claim to power "must
branches of government-executive, judicial, and legislative-to prevent excessive concen-
trations of power in a single branch. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 294 (1979). The
doctrine does not, however, require "airtight" government departments. See Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
203. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 587-89. In Youngstown the
Court held that President Truman had neither the statutory nor constitutional authority to
issue an executive order authorizing federal seizure of steel mills when that industry was
faced with a nation-wide strike during the Korean War.
204. Id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's concurrence has been fre-
quently cited. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). In Youngstown the Justices present interesting
differences of opinion on the controlling issue. The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Black, stresses the President's lack of authority under the constitutional framework separat-
ing the legislative and executive powers. 343 U.S. at 587-89. Four justices concurred in the
opinion, but also wrote separately.
205. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson acknowledged that the three group-
ings were "somewhat oversimplified":
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that be possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in
these only, may he be said . . . to personify the federal sovereignty....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiessence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. ...
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter.
Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
206. Id. at 637.
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be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system. 20 7
Since the Order states that it will not "invalidate any existing
regulations ... adopted pursuant to court order or pursuant to
judicial settlement, '20 8 environmental groups may assume that the
basic premises which led to those settlements may still be ap-
proved by the courts. Further, the Order states that it does not
prevent agencies from providing for "measures in addition to those
provided for herein to further the purpose of [NEPA]. ' '20 9 Thus
court challenges may ensue against agencies choosing to limit their
environmental impact assessments to the extent permitted by the
Order.
The overall structure of the Order establishes that agencies
"shall" prepare an EIS for actions affecting the global commons210
and "shall" choose between the less demanding assessment docu-
ments for actions affecting the environment of other nations.211
Therefore, the Order apparently does not even permit agencies to
prepare impact statements for actions affecting other countries'
environments. It is difficult to conceive how, if an agency "shall"
choose between preparing one of two less strict documents, it is
not prevented from choosing instead to prepare a different stricter
document.2
1 2
One remarkable feature of the Order is the limitation of its
207. Id. at 638. This is not to argue that the Executive Order is unconstitutional. CEQ's
own authority to write its earlier guidelines and current regulations also arises from execu-
tive orders. Exec. Order No. 11514, supra note 13; Exec. Order No. 11991, supra note 14.
These earlier orders, however, were consistent in their recognition of NEPA's authority. See
text & accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
For an interesting discussion of the source of CEQ's NEPA regulations' authority, con-
cluding that the binding nature of the regulations flows from the President's "implied statu-
tory authority," see Comment, Improving NEPA: New Regulations of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, 8 B.C. ENvr'L AvF. L. REv. 89, 115-18.
208. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(c), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980). E.g., AID's regulations
adopted to settle EDF v. AID, 6 E.L.R. 20121. See text & accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
209. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(c), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980).
210. Id. §§ 2-3(a), 2-4(a)(i), 2-4(b)(i).
211. I.e., concise reviews or bi- or multilateral studies. Id. §§ 2-3(b), (c), 2-4(a)(ii), (iii),
2-4(b)(ii), (iii), 3 C.F.R. 357-58 (1980).
212. The CEQ version of the Draft Executive Order, supra note 138, included an
agency option of assessment documents that included the EIS. The deletion, therefore, was
a State Department victory and intentional. It seems unlikely that § 2-4(e) could be con-
strued to countermand the drafters' clear intention not to make the EIS an agency option.
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scope to major federal actions "not exempted. 2 1 3 Thus it is the
exemptions as much as the inclusions which define the Order's
scope. These exemptions include not only those specifically la-
belled as such,214 but also those hidden within each of the four cat-
egories of actions for which the Order requires environmental
assessment.
The Order's first environmental assessment lirovision requires
EISs for actions "affecting the environment of the global com-
mons," but limits itself to areas "outside the jurisdiction of any
nation. '215 In fact, many areas of the oceans and other seas are
subject to the jurisdictional claims of one or more nations.2 16 Thus
areas generally considered to be part of the global commons may
be excluded, not only from the EIS requirement, but from all envi-
ronmental assessment, since such areas do not fall into any of the
other three categories of federal actions encompassed by the
Order. 1
The Order's second assessment provision contains a similar
hidden limitation. Environmental studies or concise reviews must
be prepared when a federal action significantly affects the environ-
ment of a country "not participating with the United States and
not otherwise involved in the action." 18 The Order does not make
clear whether the term "not otherwise involved" means countries
uninformed of the environmental effects of the proposed action, or
countries not consenting to the action, or has another purpose.
The Order's third category of environmental actions deals
with two classes of pollution that are strictly regulated in the
United States. 2 9 For the first of these, an environmental study or
concise review must be prepared when a foreign nation receives a
product, or a project producing or emitting a substance, which is
prohibited or strictly regulated in the United States "because its
213. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-1, 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
214. See id. § 2-5, 3 C.F.R. 358-59. See also text & accompanying notes 176-94 supra.
215. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(a), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
216. For example, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 extends
United States claims to jurisdiction over fishery resources from a former 12-mile limit to a
200-mile limit. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
217. Areas possibly excluded because of jurisdictional claims which might otherwise be
thought to be part of the global commons include the Mediterranean and North Seas. See
Comment, President Orders Environmental Review of International Actions, 9 ENVT'L L.
RE. (ELI) 10011, 10012 (Jan., 1979).
218. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(b), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980) (emphasis added).
219. Id. § 2-3(c). See text at note 174 supra.
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toxic effects on the environment create a serious public health
risk."22 0 Therefore substances (or their production) which are regu-
lated in the United States because of toxic effects other than pos-
ing a "serious public health risk" are not covered by the Order. 2 1
The second pollution class occurs where a foreign country re-
ceives a "physical project" which is prohibited or strictly regulated
in the United States to protect against radioactive substances.
222
This provision exempts by omission risks from radioactive sub-
stances which do not arise from a physical project (such as ship-
ments of nuclear fuel) and projects whose environmental risks arise
from a source other than radiation (or toxic public health risks).22 3
Thus hydroelectric plants, dams, highways, and all projects except
those posing radioactive or toxic public health risks are excluded
from the Executive Order's assessment requirements by hidden
exemptions.
The fourth category of actions encompassed by the Order is
those which affect "natural or ecological resources of global impor-
tance."224 Aside from resources protected by international agree-
ment, to be designated as such by the Secretary of State, no re-
sources are covered under this subsection unless specifically
designated for protection by the President.225
The limitations on the scope. of the Order by its definitions of
significant effects and "environment" also must be interpreted as
hidden exemptions. "Environment" expressly "excludes social, eco-
220. Id. § 2-3(c)(1), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
221. One commentator notes that this provision may encompass exports of products
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 121-
136(y), and products regulated by the EPA Administrator under the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act (TOSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629. These statutes, however, regulate dangerous
chemicals according to whether they pose an "unreasonable risk" of environmental harm.
The risk is not limited (as under the Executive Order) to the "public health." See Com-
ment, supra note 217.
222. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(c)(2), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
223. Id. § 2-3(c)(2). The Draft Executive Order (CEQ version), supra note 138, did not
limit protection against "radioactive substances" to "physical project[s]." This change rep-
resented a State Department victory; the State Department has responsibility for American
adminstration of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and feels that it can more effectively
supply and monitor fuel shipments if these shipments are facilitated to as great an extent as
possible. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force for the United States, Mar. 5, 1970).
224. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(d), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
225. Id. See note 315 infra.
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nomic and other environments"' 26 in direct contradiction both to
case law22 7 and the 1978 federal regulations. 228 By defining signifi-
cant effects' in terms of significant environmental "harm, '229 the
Order has created an ambiguity which has already led at least one
federal agency to attempt to limit its impact assessment to actions
causing "significant harm."
23 0
The provision that an agency need not prepare a new assess-
ment document when an EIS, concise review, or bi- or multilateral
study already exists"' is also problematic. Since an agency may at
its discretion choose between the study and concise review when-
ever either is permitted,232 the only possible effect is to allow an
agency to forego preparing an otherwise required full EIS if one of
the lesser assessments previously has been made. Thus, NRC's re-
liance upon a concise review prepared by the State Department
and an outdated "generic" study analyzing the overall effects of
American nuclear exports, were held to be "sufficient" by the
NRDC v. NRC court. 33
The "Rights of Action" clause may prove especially trouble-
some. Its provision that "nothing in this Order shall be construed
to create a cause of action" is an apparent attempt to preclude
226. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980). See text at notes 163-64 supra.
227. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated and
remanded sub noma. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
228. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14. NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. 4342, creating CEQ, instructs the
Council to be responsive to "scientific, economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs."
229. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980).
230. The Department of Defense published regulations in final, rather than proposed,
form in April, 1979 (the first agency to do so), more than four months ahead of the Order's
deadline. 32 C.F.R. 197, 44 Fed. Reg. 21786. The rules claimed environmental reviews were
needed only for actions that do "significant harm to the environment outside the United
States" (emphasis added). A six-page list of comments on the rules, released by CEQ on
May 31, 1979, found this reference to be "plainly inconsistent" with the Executive Order's
reference to actions "significantly affecting" environments abroad. CEQ Comments on Dep't
of Defense Procedures Implementing Exec. Order 12114 (Apr. 12, 1979) (May 31, 1979) at 4
[hereinafter cited as CEQ Defense Comments]. On the whole, CEQ charged that the Depart-
ment's rules "convey a negative begrudging attitude" which "seriously undercuts" the Exec-
utive Order's credibility. Letter of N. Yost, CEQ Gen. Counsel to Deanne Seimer, Defense
Dep't Gen. Counsel (May 31, 1979) at 2. See text & accompanying notes 289-92 inlra. It
should be noted that the Draft Exec. Order, supra note 138, called for assessment of actions
"significantly and adversely affecting the environment" (emphasis added). The reference to
adverse effects, however, is dropped throughout the final version of the Executive Order.
231. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(b), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980).
232. Id. § 2-4(b)(ii), (iii), (iv), 3 C.F.R. 358.
233. 647 F.2d at 1353. The ERDA generic nuclear export study is considered outdated
by CEQ. Id. at 1388 (concurring opinion). See text & accompanying note 276 infra.
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citizens' suits seeking to force an agency to comply with the Or-
der.2 34 This would seem to force citizens into the position of filing
suit to demand compliance with the stricter requirements of
NEPA itself. The clause has also tempted at least one agency to
try to include a similar provision in its own agency procedures
promulgated to comply with the Order.3 5
The "multiple impacts" clause provides that if an action af-
fecting the United States or global commons environment (thus re-
quiring preparation of an EIS) also affects a foreign country's envi-
ronment, the agency need not prepare an EIS with respect to the
effects on the foreign nation's environment."' The clause is espe-
cially puzzling since an impact on a foreign environment never re-
quires an EIS under the Order, but merely the less demanding en-
vironmental study or concise review. 23 7 Assuming these provisions
regarding effects on a foreign nation remain in effect, where an ac-
tion also affects the United States or global commons the Order
therefore seems to require preparation of two separate documents,
using different standards of analysis for the same action. On the
other hand, if the provision exempts foreign effects from analysis
where there are also United States or global commons effects, the
provision may conflict with case law.238
Of greater significance, the "environmental impact statement"
234. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-1, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
235. The Defense Department regulations, supra note 230, also stated that nothing in
the regulations "shall be construed to create a cause of action." 32 C.F.R. § 197.1 (1980), 44
Fed. Reg. 21786. CEQ charged this also conflicts with the Executive Order and is "an im-
proper and inadvisable effort to preclude judicial review of DOD compliance with its own
procedures." CEQ Defense Comments, supra note 230, at 1.
236. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980).
237. See Comment, supra note 217, at 10014.
238. The concept of different assessment standards for domestic and foreign impacts
stems from a court-approved settlement in NORML v. Department of State, 452 F. Supp.
1226, appeal dismissed, No. 78-1669 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 1979). See text & accompanying
notes 106-08 supra. The court seems to contradict itself by assuming NEPA is fully applica-
ble while permitting the lesser assessment: "[I]n view of the defendants' willingness to pre-
pare an 'environmental analysis' of the Mexico [sic] effects . . . together with the EIS re-
quired by NEPA as to the impact ... upon the United States, the Court ... need only
assume without deciding that NEPA is fully applicable to the Mexican herbicide spraying
program." 452 F. Supp. at 1233 (emphasis added). There is no doubt, however, that the
decision requires some assessment of the foreign impacts of an action which the court finds
to be "a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
within the meaning of ... NEPA." Id. at 1232. Therefore, to the extent that the multiple
impacts clause exempts foreign impacts of actions which also have significant American or
global commons impacts, the Executive Order conflicts with the NORML decision.
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required by the Order for an action which impacts the global com-
mons (and permitted for impacts upon globally significant re-
sources)239 does not appear to be an equivalent document to the
EIS required by NEPA.4 0 Under the Order, where an EIS is re-
quired, impacts of the action within a foreign country are exempt
from the same level of assessment.241 Consideration of alternatives,
required under NEPA, does not seem to be necessary under the
Order where those alternatives involve foreign nation impacts.
Also, the Order's definition of environment excludes social, eco-
nomic and other environments, although these environments are
considered in NEPA EISs.242 Yet the Order ignores these inconsis-
tencies and clearly uses the two documents interchangeably in at
least one instance.243 Finally, the curious provision that the Order's
exemptions apply to impacts on the global commons only if per-
mitted by law implies by omission that the exemptions apply to
other foreign impacts whether or not they are otherwise lawful. 4
Much of the discussion of the NEPA-abroad controversy and
virtually all of the commentary on the Executive Order's require-
ments for only limited assessment of environmental effects in an-
other country's territory assume that CEQ's alternative was an ap-
plication of NEPA that would be both insensitive to diplomatic
concerns and deaf and blind to commercial realities.24 This is not
the case. The CEQ preliminary draft regulations2 "e which provoked
so much reaction in 1978,247 limited the applicability of the stan-
239. Exec. Order No. 12114 §§ 2-3(a), (d), 2-4(a)(i), (b)(i), (iv), 3 C.F.R. 357-58 (1980).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 for CEQ's current regulations on
EIS preparation.
241. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980).
242. Id. § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360. See text & accompanying notes 226-28 supra.
243. The "Multiple Impacts" clause begins: "[A] major Federal action having effects on
the environment of the United States or the global commons requires preparation of an
environmental impact statement. . . ." Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360 (1980)
(emphasis added). The clear implication is that the documents can be equated.
244. Id. § 2-5(d), 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980). One commentator says the proviso "unless per-
mitted by law" "means NEPA and its associated regulations and case law." Gaines, supra
note 27, at 149. The Order's very existence, however, and its avowal of representing the
government's "exclusive and complete" policy determination, appear to cast doubt on this
optimistic theory.
245. Thus Gaines speaks of "the Order's sensitivity about interference with sovereign
prerogatives of foreign governments," Gaines, supra note 27, at 153, and Brower rails
against "unilateral ... ra ishment," supra note 47.
246. CEQ Preliminary Draft Regulations, supra note 119.
247. See text & accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
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dard EIS procedure only to major activities abroad which signifi-
cantly affect (1) the United States and its trust territories, (2) the
global commons, such as the oceans, and (3) Antarctica-the same
approach that the Executive Order adopted.24 8
All other major activities having a significant foreign impact
would have required only an abbreviated "foreign environmental
statement" (FES) whose preparation could have taken into ac-
count diplomatic considerations,249 availability of information,25 e
commercial competition,251 commercial confidentiality, 252 and the
extent of the agency's role in the proposed activity.2 53 An FES
would have required considerably less information than a standard
EIS.254
The draft regulations did state clearly, however, that they
were issued under the authority of NEPA25 5 and that the "human
environment" includes "the natural and physical environment and
the interaction of people with that environment" and "is not con-
fined to the geographical borders of the United States. '256 There-
fore, the argument that the openness and public participation of
the NEPA decisionmaking process "would interfere with other re-
sponsibilities and courtesies that the United States owed to foreign
countries," is akin to shooting down the proverbial straw man; the
CEQ preliminary draft regulations allowed for these concerns and
agency flexibility.
B. An Alternative: Applying NEPA Abroad
Any discussion of the Order's impact must also analyze what
would have been the likely impact of applying NEPA to extraterri-
torial environmental impacts. Such application is supported by the
positive experiences of agencies which applied NEPA to their over-
248. The Executive Order, however, redefines the global commons to include Antarc-
tica, § 2-3(a), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
249. CEQ Preliminary Draft Regulations, supra note 119, § 1508(b)(2)(ii).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 1508(b)(2)(iii).
252. Id.
253. Le., whether the agency is merely passing on proposals developed elsewhere, or
involved in early planning or joint sponsorship. Id. § 1508(b)(2)(ii).
254. Id. §§ 1508(a), 1502.13-15.
255. Id. § 1506.13 ("Application of NEPA to Significant Environmental Effects Not
Confined to the United States.").
256. Id. § 1508.13 (emphasis added).
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seas activities before the Executive Order was issued. 257 In a 1977
analysis prepared for the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the AID Administrator stated that the most cited reasons
for not undertaking foreign EISs had not proved valid in AID's
experience.2 58 He observed that AID's experience in complying
with a court settlement requiring foreign impact assessment 25 was,
overall, "a positive one," and concluded:
[W]e have discovered that developing countries themselves have come in-
creasingly to recognize the inter-related nature of environment and develop-
ment and to seek to ensure that environmental considerations are adequately
addressed in development projects. Further, the practical experience of A.I.D.
has been that it is possible to undertake detailed environmental analyses of
U.S.-supported projects abroad and that the results obtained are useful to us,
as well as to host country planners, in making project decisions.
260
Applying NEPA extraterritorially also would enable the gov-
ernment to deal effectively with environmental problems and
ramifications which are not encompassed by the Executive Order.
For instance, a hydroelectric project in Brazil was partly financed
257. See, e.g., the following EISs on agency impacts outside the United States: Depart-
ment of Commerce, NOAA, Importation of South African Sealskins, Moratorium Waiver,
No. 60209 (1976); Department of State, AID, Worldwide Pest Management Program, No.
70593 (1977). See also note 127 supra.
258. John Gilligan, Administrator AID, letter to C. Warren, Chairman CEQ (Dec. 9,
1977), reprinted in Eximbank Hearings, supra note 133, at 222. Gilligan noted that:
1. AID has been able to undertake environmental analyses "without strain" on
foreign relations, and that in fact, environmental reviews are no more intrusive
than other reviews;
2. achievement of AID's mandate has not been impaired by the conduct of envi-
ronmental analyses;
3. United States jobs have not been lost because of the FEIS requirement;
4. FEIS preparation costs have not been excessive.
Id. at 222-23.
259. See discussion of EDF v. AID, supra notes 145-46 & accompanying text.
260. Gilligan letter, supra note 258, at 222. At the Eximbank Hearings, Albert Printz,
representing AID, supplied material showing environmental assessment or EIS preparation
in eleven countries including Sri Lanka, Philippines, Guyana, Panama, Peru, Liberia,
Tanzania, Senegal, Yemen, Lesotho, and Pakistan. Eximbank Hearings, supra note 133, at
227. Similar assessment was planned or in progress in many other nations. Id. at 228-30.
The following interchange took place:
Sen. Muskie: Have you encountered resistance in the recipient countries?
Mr. Printz: [W]e have not .... [A]s we go through the process ... the coun-
tries recognize that what we are doing is designed to protect their environment
and natural resource base.
Id. at 224.
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by two United States agencies. 61 Unexpected environmental ef-
fects necessitated $150 million in additional expenditures to con-
trol floods and resettle farmers.2 62 Environmental assessment dur-
ing the planning process might have forestalled those problems,
yet the Order requires no assessment of any kind for this type of
project.
A well-meaning American attempt to improve sanitary and di-
etary standards in the Ryuku Islands' schools indirectly led to the
spread among children of the serious eye disease, trachoma.263
American introduction of piped water in the same islands led to a
serious dysentary outbreak. 2" Since the outbreak was not caused
by a project strictly regulated in the United States because of its
toxic effects, 265 the Executive Order requires no assessment of any
kind for 'these types of projects. An EIS, however, might have
warned project planners of potential dangers.
There are other instances of international assistance in irriga-
tion projects, agricultural development, livestock improvement
programs, and foreign dam construction in which significant ad-
verse environmental, social, and economic effects occurred, but
might have been prevented with prior environmental assessment of
a type not provided for by the Exective Order.2"6
C. Impact of the Executive Order: The First Three Years
The first reported case to deal with the Executive Order was
NRDC v. NRC, the Philippine reactor case. 67 In 1976 Eximbank
transacted its largest loan,268 an approval to the Republic of the
Philippines to purchase and construct a nuclear power plant, a
261. Financing also'came from two international agencies and private banks in Canada,




265. See Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(c)(1), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
266. The environmental fiasco of the Soviet Union-financed Aswan High Dam demon-
strates that no country has a corner on unexpected, disastrous ecological, social, economic,
and public health impacts stemming from development projects. For an informative and
fascinating discussion of the environmental problems of international development pro-
grams and projects, see Comment, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International
Development, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 321, 321-34 (1976).
267. 647 F.2d 1345.
268. Eximbank authorized a loan of $277 million and additional guarantees of $367
million. Warren Remarks, supra note 120, at S6516.
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project to which the State Department instructed our Philippines
embassy to "give all possible encouragement. ' 26 9 The site has
turned out to be subject both to volcanic and earthquake distur-
bance. Further, the Philippines government has no waste disposal
or processing plan other than to send the radioactive wastes back
to the United States. Analysis of the costs of alternative energy
sources shows that hydroelectric and geothermal facilities both
would be less costly.27 0 An EIS would have revealed these difficul-
ties and the attractive alternatives. Under the Executive Order,
however, an EIS is neither required nor an option for federal
agency actions providing a nuclear facility.
2 71
When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 1980 approval for
the actual export of the same power plant was challenged in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals,27 2 the Commission asserted,
and the court agreed, that it was sufficient for the agency to rely on
the concise environmental review prepared by the State Depart-
ment pursuant to the Executive Order, and on previously prepared
generic analyses of the overall nuclear export program,27 3 particu-
larly a 1976 report prepared by the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration.274 Yet this report, on which NRC principally
relied,275 is considered by CEQ to be outdated and "insufficient for
considering the environmental effects of the proposed Philippine
reactor export under NEPA. ''276 Further, NRC's refusal to prepare
an on-site EIS particularly precluded the agency from adequately
assessing the volcanic and seismic hazards of the site, a conclusion
reached by the International Atomic Energy Authority.277
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Exec. Order No. 12114 §§ 2-3(c)(2), 2-4(a)(ii), (iii), 2-4(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 357-58
(1980)..
272. 647 F.2d 1345.
273. Id. at 1353.
274. ERDA, Final Environmental Statement on U.S. Nuclear Power Export Activi-
ties, ERDA-1542 (1976). The court emphasized that NRC "had the benefit" of this report.
647 F.2d at 1353 n.30.
275. 647 F.2d at 1388 (concurring opinion).
276. Letter from C. Foster Knight, Acting General Counsel, CEQ, to John F. Ahearne,
Chairman, NRC, at 2 (Feb. 29, 1980), quoted in 647 F.2d at 1388 (concurring opinion). CEQ
asserted that only a small part of the report relates to impacts on the global commons, and
that the report fails to discuss any specific sites or their seismic or geological conditions, or
waste management practices. 11 N.R.C. at 658.
277. 647 F.2d at 1383 (concurring opinion). A 1978 International Atomic Energy Au-
thority (IAEA) expert mission to the Philippines concluded that the risk associated with
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Following the well publicized incident at the Three Mile Is-
land nuclear plant, the Philippine government suspended con-
struction of the plant and appointed a commission to study the
project. The commission's report asserted that the plant was based
"on an old design plagued with unresolved safety issues" and "as
designed is not safe. 27 8 President Marcos subsequently threatened
to cancel the entire project unless the hazards were remedied. At
the time NRDC v. NRC was argued, Westinghouse and the Philip-
pines were still negotiating the issue.279
An on-site EIS might have averted all this embarrassment, de-
lay, and added expense. Nevertheless, even with this entire fiasco
before it, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that NRC's
reliance on the State Department concise environmental review
and the outdated generic ERDA report was within the agency's
discretion and "sufficient."2 s Moreover, the court suggested that
United States regulators should show "a certain modesty . . re-
garding foreign exports which are basically someone else's prob-
lem,' ' 1 advice which flies in the face of both the spirit and letter
of NEPA, 2 as well as the Executive Order which claims to further
283NEPA's purpose.
The most immediate impact of the new Order was that it led
to settlement in the NRDC v. Eximbank suit.28 4 On September 4,
1979 Eximbank published procedures to protect against foreign en-
vironmental degradation as a result of exports financed under its
direct lending program. 285 At a conference on United States inter-
nearby volcanoes was "unique" to the industry, and that the eruption of Mt. Natib, about
five miles away, "is a credible event which should be taken into account in design." Report
of the IAEA Safety Mission for a Review of Geological and Geotechnical Aspects of the Site
and Its Environment for the PNPP-1, at 7 (July, 1978), quoted in 647 F.2d at 1370 n.14
(concurring opinion).
278. Commission on Nuclear Reactor Plants, In Re: Inquiry on the Safety to the Public
of the Bataan Nuclear Plant [PNPP-1] (per Executive Order 539, June 15, 1979) at IVB-1,
quoted in 647 F.2d at 1383 n.133 (concurring opinion).
279. 647 F.2d at 1383 n.133 (concurring opinion).
280. 647 F.2d at 1353.
281. Id. at 1365 n.105.
282. E.g., "[lo support ... international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment." NEPA § 102(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(F).
283. Exec. Order 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980).
284. No. 77-0080, 9 E.L.R. 20145 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1979). See text & accompanying
notes 152-54 supra.
285. 12 C.F.R. § 409, 44 Fed. Reg. 50810.
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national environmental policy in November, 1979, the Eximbank
General Counsel estimated that about fifteen percent of the
agency's projects will be affected2 8 6 He also conceded that the en-
vironmental review process would not be "unmanageable" but nev-
ertheless continued to insist that Eximbank does not have the au-
thority to, and "does not intend to, dictate policy to foreign
countries.
28 7
The first federal agency to adopt regulations under the Order
was the Defense Department.28  Certain of the Defense Depart-
ment provisions, however, quickly provoked scathing criticism
from the Council on Environmental Quality, which charged that
the rules "appear preoccupied with exemptions and limitations"
and in general "convey a negative and begrudging attitude.
'289
CEQ criticized the department for adopting the rules without first
proposing them,2 0 and attached to the letter a six-page list of com-
ments,291  objecting to many of the regulations' specific
provisions.292
286. W. Glick, Comments Before Conference of Seminar on U.S. International Environ-
mental Policy: Impact on American Industry, at Carnegie Conference Center, Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Glick Remarks]. Under Eximbank's procedures,
projects covered by Eximbank programs other than the direct lending program (e.g,, ex-
porter credit and guarantees) are excluded because they are not expected to have significant
environmental effects. Whether a project has such significant effects will be determined by
Eximbank engineers. Five criteria for determining whether the financing of a project is an
included "major" action are established: (1) the percentage of total costs covered by Ex-
imbank financing, (2) the percentage that Eximbank financing represents of the total
financing for United States goods and services being purchased, (3) the function of the pro-
curement for which Eximbank financing is requested viewed against the overall purpose of
the project, (4) the likelihood that the project will go ahead with or without Eximbank
financing, and (5) the degree of Eximbank's responsibility for and control over the project.
12 C.F.R. § 409, 44 Fed. Reg. 50813-16.
287. Glick Remarks, supra note 286.
288. 32 C.F.R. § 197, 44 Fed. Reg. 21786 (effective Mar. 31, 1979). The regulations,
published as a final rather than a proposed rule, generally follow the structure of the Execu-
tive Order, distinguishing among actions that affect the global commons, participating for-
eign countries, and globally important natural resources.
289. Letter of N. Yost, supra note 230, at 2.
290. Id. The letter charged, "it is counterproductive to publish legally vulnerable proce-
dures which do not carry out the President's intent."
291. CEQ Defense Comments, supra note 230.
292. For instance, CEQ objected to DOD's provision for "class exemptions," 32 C.F.R. §
197.6 app. Enclosure 2(C)(3)(b)([2]), 44 Fed. Reg. 21790, rather than specific exemptions,
for groups of related actions. CEQ claimed that "class exemptions" was a term used in
neither the Executive Order nor NEPA, and that elimination of these exemptions from the
DOD procedures was "essential for the integrity and credibility of [the] Executive Order."
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Not every agency included under the Order 93 attempted to
exclude as many actions as possible from its assessment proce-
dures.294 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) published an interim directive just before the Executive
Order was issued which contains more comprehensive procedures
and more extensive requirements than the Order.293 NOAA's Gen-
eral Counsel said the agency anticipated the Executive Order and
had been concerned that the Order might require the agency to
CEQ Defense Comments, supra note 230, at 3.
CEQ also objected to the regulations' definition of "environmental review" as a "survey"
of relevant environmental issues. 32 C.F.R. § 197.6 app. Enclosure 2(E)(1), (4). CEQ charged
that the provision "implies a listing of issues without analysis including analysis of alterna-
tives." CEQ Defense Comments, supra note 230, at 4.
293. Agencies whose actions have no extraterritorial impacts were permitted to exempt
themselves from the requirement to promulgate regulations by so informing CEQ. C. War-
ren, Chmn. CEQ, & T. Pickering, Assistant Sec'y of State for Oceans and Int'l Envt'l &
Scientific Affairs, Memorandum for Heads of Agencies with International Activities (Feb.
27, 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 18722, 18723. Among these exempted agencies are the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, United States Postal Ser-
vice, Federal Trade Commission, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Department of Labor.
294. Although the Executive Order required agency implementation within eight
months of its issuance, only four agencies published final procedures by the Sept. 4, 1979
deadline. Department of Defense (final procedures issued Apr. 12, 1979 at 32 C.F.R. § 197,
44 Fed. Reg. 21786); Overseas Private Investment Corp. (final procedures issued Aug. 31,
1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 51385); Export-Import Bank (final procedures issued Aug. 30, 1979 at 12
C.F.R. § 409, 44 Fed. Reg. 50813); National Aeronautics and Space Ad. (see Final NEPA
procedures § 1216.321 issued July 30, 1979 at 14 C.F.R. § 1216.321, 44 Fed. Reg. 44485,
44490-91). Two other agencies issued proposed guidelines or procedures. Department of En-
ergy (proposed Guidelines issued Sept. 6, 1979 at 44 Fed. Reg. 52146); Department of
Transportation (see proposed NEPA procedures § 16 issued May 31, 1979 at 44 Fed. Reg.
31341, 31347).
Most agencies-including the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, aird Trea-
sury, AID, and even the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-filed from two to eleven
months late. The State Department issued its procedures in November, 1979, in two parts,
the first on the transfer of nuclear reactors abroad, 44 Fed. Reg. 65560, and the second
covering non-nuclear actions at 44 Fed. Reg. 67004. At the same time the State Department
was engaged in "a low-key campaign" to prod other nations to consider transboundary as-
sessments. 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 930 (Nov. 14, 1979).
Other agencies issued their proposed and then final procedures during the remaining
weeks of 1979, and throughout 1980. The last agencies to implement procedures were the
Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Interior.
295. NOAA, directive 02-10, quoted in 10 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1709 (Jan. 12, 1979). The
directive calls for an EIS "for each major NOAA activity which may significantly affect the
quality of the human environment, wherever the activity of impact occurs, inside or outside
the United States." The directive also encompasses activities which endanger any species or




IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
NEPA "was necessary because existing agencies, mission-ori-
ented and steeped in the country's developmental ethic, were un-
likely to accord environmental factors their due. ' 297 If NEPA is
Congress' determination of the procedures needed to give environ-
mental factors "their due," Executive Order No. 12114 falls short.
It should be terminated and the issue of foreign application of
NEPA should be incorporated into Council on Environmental
Quality regulations.
While the Order remains in effect, certain changes would en-
able it more adequately to further NEPA's purposes and policies.
First, the Order should specifically acknowledge a statutory au-
thority. Otherwise it should expressly identify its "independent au-
thority. '29 In either case the CEQ-muzzling assertion that the Or-
der is the "exclusive and complete determination" of applicable
government procedures 299 should be eliminated.
An agency should assume the burden of proof to justify an as-
sessment less than a full EIS. The Order should clarify distinctions
between the "environmental impact statement" required by the
Order for impacts on the global commons and the EIS required by
NEPA.300 Also, the limitation of the global commons to areas
"outside the jurisdiction of any nation" should be clarified or
dropped.30 1
EISs (or FESs as prescribed in the CEQ preliminary draft reg-
296. E. Greenberg, quoted in 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 513 (Feb. 10, 1979). The direc-
tive was issued, however, before the Executive Order, which provides that it does not pre-
vent an agency from providing in its procedures "in addition" to those prescribed by the
Order. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(c), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980). NOAA also noted that this same
provision of the Order holds that it does not "serve to invalidate any existing regulations of
any agency." Id. See 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA), supra, at 513. Reliance on this clause is
questionable, however, because it continues, " . . . which have been adopted pursuant to
court order or pursuant to judicial settlement of any case." Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-4(c).
NOAA's regulations did not arise out of such an order or settlement.
297. E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK & J. HANKS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 132 (1974)
(abridged ed.).
298. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980). See text & accompanying notes
199-203 supra.
299. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980). See text at note 198 supra.
300. See text & accompanying notes 239-43 supra.
301. See text & accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
658 [Vol. 30
19811 "NEPA-ABROAD" CONTROVERSY 659
ulations) 30° should not be omitted from the permissible "docu-
ments to be used" for impacts upon non-participating foreign na-
tions. The assessment requirement for impacts upon countries
"not participating" in the agency action should not be additionally
limited to countries "not otherwise involved" in the action.303 At
the very least, this seemingly superfluous proviso, which may refer
either to uninformed or to nonconsenting countries, or both,
should be clarified.
EISs (or FESs) should be permitted for impacts upon a for-
eign country caused by export of toxic products, or projects pro-
ducing them, which create a serious public health risk. Also, toxic
effects of products that are strictly regulated in the United States
and pose dangers other than "serious public health risks" should
not be exempted from assessment.3 0 4 Similarly, the effects of phys-
ical projects encompassed by the Order should not be limited to
toxic public health risks or radioactive risks. 0 5
The EIS (or FES) requirement should apply to all actions
dealing with nuclear facilities,306 and the exemption for other nu-
clear (non-facility related) actions307 should be dropped. The pro-
302. See text & accompanying notes 249-54 supra.
303. See text & accompanying note 218 supra.
304. See text & accompanying notes 220-21 supra.
305. See text & accompanying notes 222-23 supra.
306. See Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(c)(2), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
307. Id. § 2-5(a)(v), 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980). The recommendation to drop the exemption
for "activities relating to nuclear activities" is based on the premise that nuclear related
sections of the Order will be implemented. Although Sen. Stevenson withdrew his amend-
ment seeking to exempt the Export-Import Bank from NEPA, see text & accompanying
notes 128 & 141 supra, section 1913 of the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1978 (in-
troduced by Sen. Heinz) states:
No environmental rule, regulation, or procedure shall become effective with re-
gard to exports subject to the provisions of ... the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978 [22 U.S.C. § 3201 et seq.], until such time as the President has re-
ported to Congress on the progress achieved pursuant to section 407 of the Act
[42 U.S.C. § 2153e] . . . which requires the President to seek to provide, in
agreements required under the Act, for cooperation between the parties in pro-
tecting the environment from radioactive, chemical, or thermal contaminants
arising from peaceful nuclear activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2153e-1. This provision prevents any agency from putting into effect environ-
mental rules or procedures otherwise required by the Executive Order for nuclear exports.
In a letter to President Carter, Heinz and Stevenson said the amendment was designed to
"encourage a whole-hearted effort by your administration to implement the international
approach to environmental protection. . . , before imposing additional unilateral restraints
on U.S. nuclear exports." The letter included seven specific categories of information that
should be included by the President in the report to Congress required by the amendment.
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vision allowing agencies to add to the list of categorical exclu-
sions308 should also be dropped.
The "multiple impacts" clause providing that if an action oth-
erwise requires an EIS and also affects the environment of a for-
eign country, an EIS need not be prepared with respect to the lat-
ter effects, 0 9 should be clarified; the Order should specify whether
such impacts on foreign environments are therefore excluded from
all environmental assessment, or alternatively, whether the situa-
tion requires two separate documents using two different evalua-
tion standards for the same action.3 10
NEPA is designed around an action-forcing environmental im-
pact assessment mandate. The Order's "rights of action" section,
precluding causes of action,311 is inconsistent with that mandate
and does not further the purpose of the Act.3 1 2 The provision
should be eliminated. Similarly, the explicit requirement that ex-
emptions must be permitted by law to apply to actions affecting
the global commons, and the implication by omission that the ex-
emptions need not be otherwise lawful to apply to other significant
foreign impacts,1 3 should be clarified. Such an implication furthers
neither the policy of NEPA nor any other law.
The mechanism and criteria by which the President will desig-
nate resources of global significance 314 should be spelled out.3 15
Letter from Sens. Heinz & Stevenson to Pres. Carter (Dec. 18, 1978), quoted in 2 INTL
ENviL REP. (BNA) 512-13 (Feb. 10, 1979). In Feb., 1979 a State Department official "could
not predict" when such a report might be finished. Heinz and Stevenson recommended that
the report not be submitted until "after completion of a significant number of negotiations"
with nuclear trading partners of the United States "to gauge the possible need for unilateral
action by the U.S." 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 513 (Feb. 10, 1979).
308. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-5(c), 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
309. Id. § 3-5, 3 C.F.R. 360.
310. See text & accompanying notes 237-38 supra.
311. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 3-1, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
312. See text & accompanying notes 234-35 supra.
313. See text & accompanying note 244 supra.
314. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 2-3(d), 3 C.F.R. 359 (1980).
315. See text at notes 224-25 supra. A White House Fact Sheet, released to accompany
President Carter's Aug., 1979 Message on the Environment, announced that the President
was "directing [CEQ and the State Department] to report to him in six months on the best
ways to designate the globally important resources." CEQ, THE PRESIDENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAM: 1979, at 56. An internal CEQ memorandum noted how "extremely hard [it was]
to conceptualize how certain kinds, extents, or geographic locations could be designated as
'globally important'," and recommended a study (to be jointly funded with the State De-
partment) "on ways to designate" those resources. CEQ Memorandum from K. Gillman to
G. Speth et al. (Oct. 23, 1979).
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Also, the United States should make all practicable efforts in inter-
national law forums to have the principle of the EIS adopted by
other countries.
Finally, the Order fails to provide for public access to the for-
eign assessment documents it mandates.3 16 Such a categorical
omission conflicts with NEPA and far exceeds the legitimate limi-
tations based on specific foreign policy or national security con-
cerns. The Order should be amended to provide expressly for pub-
lic access and involvement.
Most of the Order's exemptions-for diplomatic, national se-
curity, and commercial necessities-are reasonable, but they were
already allowed under NEPA and the Act's interpretation in the
CEQ preliminary draft regulations.3 17 The Executive Order creates
a new environmental policy, never authorized by Congress; it is an
environmental policy which in many potential instances is not
based on environmental concerns at all. If the Order is therefore
unnecessary, a search for its true purpose-its hidden objec-
tives-is warranted. The Order's purpose seems five-fold: (1) to
dodge the question of whether NEPA applies;318 (2) to stave off
both the business groups and the environmental groups that had
been lobbying; (3) to foreclose judicial review; (4) to provide less
incentive for Congressional action; and (5) to muzzle CEQ, barring
future regulations under NEPA.
The Executive Order is a victory for those agencies and com-
mercial organizations which opposed applying NEPA overseas. In
both form and approach the Order restricts its own application to
circumvent the intention of NEPA, not to "further" the Act's pur-
pose. The Order fails both in its effort to have the executive
branch speak with one voice on the issue,319 and in its attempt to
resolve the original legal controversy surrounding NEPA's foreign
316. Apparently EISs prepared for impacts on the global commons must be filed with
the EPA, and are available in the same manner as other NEPA-required EISs. The environ-
mental studies and concise reviews prepared under the Exec. Order for most extraterritorial
impacts, however, remain mere internal documents of the agency, and are neither centrally
filed with the EPA, nor otherwise published.
317. See text at notes 246-54 supra.
318. Ironically, since the Department of State and other agencies wanted NEPA not to
apply, and CEQ felt that the Order's provisions do not fulfill NEPA's policy, both had rea-
sons to agree to the compromise language of the Order furthering NEPA's "purpose."
319. See, e.g., text & accompanying notes 230 & 289-92 supra.
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applicability.320 It is doubtful that it succeeds in fulfilling even its
"hidden" objectives. Rather it aggravates the controversy with
multiple exemptions, modifications, and exclusions that already
have resulted in new agency conflicts321 and new litigation.
322
A revised executive order based on NEPA's authority and
more similar to the Act's structure might resolve the controversy
and be a legitimate claimant to being the "government's exclusive
and complete"323 policy determination. As the Order stands it is
more likely that any one of the three other courses open to the
Administration-insisting on resolution by agency action (i.e.,
CEQ regulations), encouraging Congressional action, or seeking
(rather than avoiding) judicial resolution-would be a more effec-
tive resolution, from both administrative and policy standpoints.
GLENN PINCUS
320. See text at note 209 supra.
321. The NRC received the Executive Branch's concise environmental review (pursuant
to the Executive Order) of the Philippine reactor export application even before the Com-
mission published its procedures to implement the Order, 11 N.R.C. at 634 n.10. The NRC's
plurality opinion states that the NRC "examined the Exec. Order, and that § 2-5(a)(v) spe-
cifically exempts NRC licensing decisions from the Order's provisions. Therefore, the Com-
mission asserts that under the Order it need consider "only the Executive Branch recom-
mendation." 11 N.R.C. at 643. In his dissent Commissioner Bradford declares that the
Commission's decision is "unsound law and bad policy." 11 N.R.C. at 669 (dissenting view).
He disparages the concise review, asserting, "[t]hat document is little more than a descrip-
tion of a reactor." Id. at 669 n.6 (dissenting view). For CEQ's criticism of the NRC's reliance
on ERDA's generic EIS, see note 276 supra.
322. It would appear that new litigation would first have to resolve the ambiguous issue
of whether the rights of action preclusion, § 3-1, applies to agency rules promulgated under
the Order, or only applies to the Order. Then courts would find themselves faced with an
uncomfortable constitutional conflict between the provisions of NEPA and the authority of
the Exec. Order. See text & accompanying notes 199-207 supra. On the other hand, if courts
find no conflict, then they will be put in the situation the Executive Order was intended to
preclude, i.e., deciding the extra-territorial applicability of NEPA.
323. Exec. Order No. 12114 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 356-57 (1980). The NRDC v. NRC decision
never raised the issue of the Executive Order's exclusivity. Rather the court considered
NRC's impacts abroad in the contexts of both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and
NEPA.
